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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH SECURITY CULTURE: A 
REALITY OR MYTH? 
Bulut,Serkan 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu 
September 2010 
 
 
 Turkish journey to Europe has a history longer than 40 years however 
especially in the last 10 years more and more scholars started to study 
“Europeanization of Turkey” especially the foreign policy dimension. This thesis 
aims at contributing the growing Europeanization literature by looking at the degree 
of Europeanization in Turkish Security Culture. The traditional realpolitik nature of 
Turkish Security Culture has shown signs of change in the last decade especially in 
terms of style and the process dimensions and more European means are utilized by 
Turkish policy makers. This new situation creates a critical question for anyone 
interested in Turkish politics: do those changes observed in Turkish Security 
Culture mean a European transformation has taken place? After explain and 
comparing the European and Realpolitik Security cultures, this thesis shows that 
Turkish Security Culture has undergone a change in terms of the style security 
matters are handles and in terms of processes involved, yet the ultimate goals 
Turkey pursuing are still defined in terms of realpolitik mindset. True 
Europeanization requires pursuit of European ends with European means and 
against this background, Turkish Security Culture, which desires to achieve 
realpolitik ends but wits European means, does not fit in to the definition of 
European Security Culture.  
 
Keywords: Europeanization, Security, Turkish Security Culture, Realpolitik, 
transformation                                                     
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK GÜVENLİK KÜLTÜRÜNÜN AVRUPALILAŞMASI: GERÇEK Mİ 
EFSANE Mİ? 
Bulut,Serkan 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü  
Tez Yöneticisi: Asist. Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu  
Eylül 2010 
 
 
 
Türkiye’nin Avrupa yolculuğu 40 yıldan daha uzun bir geçmişe sahiptir ancak 
özellikle son 10 yılda çok daha fazla akademisyen Türkiye'nin Avrupalılaşmasını, 
özellikle de dış politika boyutunu çalışmaya başladı. Bu tez büyümekte olan 
Avrupalılaşma literatürüne Türkiye’nin Güvenlik Kültürün Avrupalılaşması 
konusunu araştırarak katkıda bulunmaya çalışmaktadır. Türk Güvenlik Kültürünün 
geleneksel Realpolitik doğası, özelliklede son on yılda, tarz ve süreç açısında 
değişim sinyalleri vermekte ve çok daha fazla Avrupai yöntemler kullanılmaya 
başlandı Türk politika yapıcıları tarafından. Bu yeni durum Türk siyaseti ile 
ilgilenen tüm kesimler için kritik bir soru ortaya çıkarmıştır: Gözlemlenen bu 
değişimler Türk Güvenlik Kültürünün Avrupalılaştığı anlamına mı gelmektedir? Bu 
tez, Avrupa Güvenlik Kültürü ve Realpolitik Güvenlik Kültürlerini karşılaştırdıktan 
sonra Türk Güvenlik Kültüründe güvenlik meselelerinin ele alındığı biçim ve 
gerçekleşen süreçler açısından çeşitli değişimler olduğu ancak Türkiye’nin 
ulaşmayı amaçladığı nihai hedeflerin halen Realpolitik bakış açısı ile 
tanımlandığını göstermektedir. Gerçek Avrupalılaşma Avrupai hedeflerin Avrupai 
araçlar ile elde edilmesini gerektirmektedir ve şu anki duruma bakıldığında 
Realpolitik hedeflere Avrupai araçlar ile ulaşmayı öngören Türk güvenlik Kültürü 
Avrupa güvenlik Kültürü çerçevesine uymamaktadır.  
 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupalılaşma, güvenlik, Türk Güvenlik Kültürü, Realpolitik, 
Dönüşüm 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“The search for security is primordial, and never before in history 
has human society faced the multidirectional challenges that will 
predictably develop in the coming decades. Our times demand the 
very best efforts from those who study security, for world politics 
today is hounded not only by traditional interstate conflicts but 
also by nuclear-armed regional threats, ever more innovative and 
dangerous terrorist strategies, new problems arising from the 
dynamics of globalization, the challenges of inflamed religious 
and ideological extremism, the politics of rage provoked by 
obscene disparities of wealth and opportunity, and all the 
complexities caused by the momentum of global environmental 
change” (Booth 2005:35). 
 
 
In the last fifty years Europe has undergone a tremendous economic and 
geopolitical transformation the architects of the European Union (EU) hardly could 
have imagined. Suffered the unprecedented destruction of the World War, the 
European states were brought together to create a common future in which the 
destiny of one another will depend on each other. From the corridors of the Palazzo 
dei Conservatori where Rome Treaty came into life to headquarters in Brussels, 
from initial steps to create common economic sphere in 1950’s to ensure deep 
2 
 
social political integration in 90’s, step by step, Europe walked the path of 
integration, with slow and cautious enlargement steps. “The political dissolution of 
the East-West divide has left Europe scrambling to redefine its relation to Eastern 
Europe, both in terms of the long-awaited enlargement to the east and in terms of a 
real foreign policy toward Russia, Asia and Africa (Burgess, 2003). 
While Europe was reorganizing itself and trying to solidify the ties that hold Europe 
together through enlargement and deepening economic-political integration, Turkey, 
wanted to be a part of the new Europe and an equal member of the emerging 
community/union 
 
Since 1959, the application for associate membership to European Economic 
Community (EEC), respective Turkish governments spent time and money to carry 
European norms and standards to Turkey, which in return were expected to carry 
Turkey to EU. As a natural and desired consequence of this process, many aspects 
of Turkish economic and political life evolved in line with European expectations, 
which can also be called as “Europeanization”. Turkish Security mind-set and 
security practices or “Turkish Security Culture (TSC)” as a whole was no exception 
to that.         
 
Since 1990’s and especially after 2000, we have seen a significant increase in 
scholarly work dealing with Turkish-EU relations and an important portion of this 
work concentrated on Europeanization of different aspect of Turkish political life. 
As a contribution to this growing literature, this thesis examines Turkish Security 
Culture and tries to see if it has undergone a “European” transformation as a result 
of which TSC would evolve from its Realpolitik mind-set to the European mind-set. 
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This study sees the nature of TSC as a “defensive Realpolitik” one and asks the 
following question: Is there a European transformation (Europeanization) in TSC 
(with which Turkey might be moving away from Realpolitik Security Culture to 
European Security Culture)?  
 
It attempts at answering this question by describing the ongoing developments and 
changes in TSC in line with Europeanization process and it continues with 
discussion of the indicators and possible reasons of such a transformation. In doing 
so, it touches upon the historical origins and development of TSC to provide a 
better understanding as to why Turkey ended up with such a security culture and 
based on the historical dimensions as well as geopolitical reasons this thesis voice 
the claim that the transformation witnessed in Turkish Security Culture is limited at 
best as Turkey is still pursuing realpolitik goals in its region, only with more 
“European means” this time. According to the conceptualization of European 
Security Culture in this thesis, to achieve a true European Security Culture, a state 
should be pursuing “European ends” (such as spreading the common norms, 
seeking a normative and ideation transformation etc.) with “European means” (non-
military channels, education, integration, economic relations etc.) 
 
The methodology followed for this research relies on description of the facts and 
explanation of possible causes behind, in which the emphasis is on estimation 
rather than testing. The difficulty of measuring or testing Security Culture stands in 
the way as an obstacle and presents itself as a limitation for this type of research. 
Available secondary data from media (newspapers, news agencies, TV and radio 
channels and all other and eligible forms) books, monographs, articles from 
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periodical academic journals, and some primary data from declarations, speeches, 
press releases, and official unclassified documents published in the web-pages of 
the various governmental and non-governmental bodies are used to present 
information and verify claims and justify arguments. 
 
The chapters of the thesis are designed in a way to allow a broad start on security 
and narrow it down to security culture in general and Turkish Security Culture in 
particular. Starting with general theoretical discussion on the nature of security and 
the possibility of a transformation in security, Chapter II prepares the theoretical 
framework within which the security culture discussions are situated. In this sense 
various International Relations theories are surveyed and their approach to a 
transformation in security mind-set is demonstrated wherever possible.  
 
Chapter III focuses on several concepts that are used throughout the thesis and it 
specifies the nature and different dimensions of National Security Culture such as 
national security, national culture, identity etc. It concludes with the indicators of 
transformation in security culture and in this vein it proposes; style, process and 
outcome as parameters to see if a transformation is in place.  
 
With Chapter IV this study put forth two alternative security cultures; European and 
Realpolitik. Those two alternative security mind-sets are defined and compared and 
based on those definitions and conceptualization, later on this study evaluates the 
situation of TSC as well as the transformation that is thought to be happening.  
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Lastly in Chapter V, various dimensions of TSC are laid bare and indicators and 
possible explanations of a European transformation in TSC are evaluated. In the 
finally analysis, this thesis claims that it is difficult to deny the changes taking place 
in Turkish Security Culture and many scholars would label these changes 
Europeanization with rightful reasons of their own. However within the confines of 
the European Security Culture definition of this thesis, it is not possible to say that 
a European transformation has truly taken place in TSC and no longer does Turkey 
operate on a Realpolitik mind-set. The argument here is that European Security 
Culture demands pursuing European ends with European means and in the case 
Turkey, it still has realpolitik goals in mind only this time it expanded it’s portfolio 
of tools to include European instruments as it is more probable to reach those 
realpolitik aspirations with European means.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 THEORETICAL APROACHES and CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS:  
WHAT IS SECURITY AND HOW DOES IT TRANSFORM? 
 
 
 
2.1Security and Identity 
 
This chapter will try to explain the nature of “Security” as an International 
Relations concept. In this process it will discuss why the “simple” question of 
“what is security” is very complicated to answer in deed. This chapter will try to 
identify the variables that add up to the complexity of the concept of Security, 
before moving on to uncovering the transformation that might be happening in the 
security culture of Turkey. The chapter will try to demonstrate alternative questions 
about Security and will continue with various theoretical approaches that are 
providing competing explanations for the security questions and transformation of 
security culture.  
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2.1.1 Understanding Security 
 
Security matters! It is impossible to make sense of world politics without making 
reference to it (Williams 2008; 1). While the concept itself is very important, like 
many other concepts in the International Relations discipline, it has no single 
definition. This is partly because “what security is” and “how it is handled” differs 
from one place to another, from one state to the other. It is also because of the 
complex nature of the Security concept itself.  
 
Security is a dynamic phenomenon that is continuously evolving into new 
meanings and forms such as human security, environmental security, food security, 
national security, etc. Throughout time and place, the meaning it has assumed 
varies, which is partly responsible for the different explanations that are at hand. 
Because of this transformation and complexity, students of security studies are 
constantly seeing scholars of the field trying to define security or are urging 
researchers and practitioners of the field to re-define/ re-conceptualize the concept 
over and over.1  
  
From the first moment of our existence on planet earth, Security has always been a 
major issue for humanity. At many different levels, people have come to expect 
                                                 
1
 Rethinking security by Robert Hall and Carl Fox, Rethinking Insecurity, War and Violence by 
Damian Grenfell and Paul James, Rethinking Security Governance by Christopher Daase and 
Cornelius Friesendorf, Rethinking Security in Nigeria: Conceptual Issues in the Quest for Social 
Order and National Integration by Dapo Adelugba and Philip Ogo Ujomu, Rethinking Security: The 
Environmental Connection by Gregory D. Foster, Rethinking Security after the Cold War by Barry 
Buzan, Rethinking Security: Ambiguities in Policy and Theory by Simon Dolby, Rethinking Human 
Security by Gary King and Christopher Murray, Rethinking National Security by Theodore C. 
Sorensen, Re-conceptualizing Security in Mexico: In search of Security by Richard C. Rockwell and 
Richard H. Moss and Re-conceptualizing Security in the 21st Century: Conclusions for Research 
and Policy-making in the book Globalization and Environmental Challenges by 
Úrsula Oswald Spring and Hans Günter Brauch, and many more books and journal articles in this 
direction, clearly exemplifies this point. 
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violence and are exposed to security threats as part of everyday civilized life. Yet, 
despite contemporary experiences with violence (from small scale armed conflict to 
all out world war), many are surprised to learn that the troubled times of the present 
extend into the distant past; as far back as the early periods of human inhabitation 
(Martin & Frayer, 1997). 
 
As soon as early humans appeared, they sought secure areas to dwell and they 
developed equipment to protect themselves, their possessions and their habitat from 
the predators of their time. Trying to survive in an unpredictably dangerous world, 
one filled with unimaginable uncertainties and powerful predators, made man 
understand the importance of security and pushed him to look for ways to ensure 
his own; through the development of fire-making, for example. Originating 
1.500.000 years ago, this important advancement, which brought everyday benefits 
like warmth and illumination, also constituted a new instrument for humans to 
provide security for themselves against wild animals and predators (Thomas, 
1995:90). 
 
As early as pre-historical times, humans strove to provide security for their 
communities and they used all available resources for this purpose, coming up with 
ways to pass the information on to coming generations so as to ensure the 
continuity of the clan or tribe’s security. As Nash (2005) suggests, ancient cave 
paintings depicting scenes of war were created by the warriors of the tribe to pass 
on strategic information about warfare tactics, battle field planning and formations 
to future generations of warriors who will be in charge of the security of the 
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community.2  Training the youth of the tribe for battle and passing the information 
gathered by the elderly to coming generations of soldiers constituted an organized 
action to provide security for the community.  
 
Thousands of years have passed since humans first appeared on earth and while 
many aspects of human life have changed since then, the need for security and the 
struggle to achieve it has not; the only difference being how humans try to ensure 
that security. The modern system of Sovereign States, whose origins can be traced 
back to 17th century, is, at its very core, about security. People yield their power to 
a higher authority and in turn this higher authority provides them with security. In 
order to escape the state of nature (where they have to provide their own security) 
people created states, combining their power to be safe and secure outside as well 
as inside.  
 
States earn the right to internal sovereignty and become legitimate in the eyes of its 
population by providing for the needs of its people, security being a major one. 
Hence, leaders are expected to provide security for the citizens of their country. To 
fulfill this responsibility, the ruling authority defines the threat and comes up with 
solutions accordingly. If the ruled population is allowed to join in and contribute to 
the process of “Securitization” (the process of defining, perceiving and interpreting 
the threat and taking action against it), then the definition of security and the 
security needs of the society and the state are more likely to overlap. This 
contribution might take various forms, ranging from participating in elections as a 
                                                 
2
 Detailed information about the ancient warfare and the importance of cave paintings for the 
prehistoric human communities: Nash, George.  2005. "Assessing rank and warfare-strategy in 
prehistoric hunter-gatherer society: a study of representational warrior figures in rock-art from the 
Spanish Levant, southeastern Spain" In Mark P. Pearson and I. J. N. Thorpe, eds., Warfare, Violence 
and Slavery in Prehistory. Oxford: Basingstoke Press, 75-86. 
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candidate or a voter to intellectual activity in related fields in order to shape and 
influence policy. The more the society is allowed to take place in security affairs, 
the more the security understandings of the state and the society will correspond. 
For instance, in states where free and fair elections are held periodically, where 
governments are accountable and all their actions are transparent, where civil 
society is powerful and the media is independent, different societal groups, with 
differing ideas about security will be able to enter into the system. Through those 
channels their views will be integrated into the system and in the end what the state 
understands from security and what it sees as the ideal instruments for providing it 
will converge with the views of society.  
 
Naturally, a situation opposite to the aforementioned would create a great 
discrepancy between the state and society in terms of security. In this situation the 
security understanding and security agenda of the state and society would differ a 
great deal. Mugabe’s Zimbabwe is a suitable example for this case. By looking at 
the facts one can infer that the main threats to the Republic of Zimbabwe are the 
catastrophic economic conditions of the country, the lack of sanitation and clean 
water and infectious diseases, not military-political issues. Zimbabwe's economic 
crisis is so dire that the official inflation rate exceeds 100,000 percent and at least 
one-quarter of the population has fled the country (Hanson 2008). Grain silos 
across the country that once held strategic grain reserves three times the 
population’s annual food needs now stand empty. In the midst of its political and 
economic crisis, Zimbabwe is being ravaged by HIV/AIDS. The country’s HIV 
prevalence rate is the world’s fifth highest (Ploch, 2009; 27). However, as the 
security agenda is set by the authoritarian government, dangerous gaps between the 
11 
 
security needs of the society and the state inevitably appear, always at the expense 
of the society.  
 
2.1.2 Globalization and transformation of Security 
 
The primary determinants of the traditional state-centric international system have 
been internal and external security concerns. These concerns explain the 
preoccupation of states with geopolitics, strategic calculations and dilemmatic 
security behavior. Inevitably, security was interpreted in territorial terms and as 
long as the defined territory of the state is secured against aggressors, the state 
assumed to have security for itself.  
 
The absolutes of the Westphalian system—territorially fixed states where 
everything of value lies within state borders; a single, secular authority governing 
each territory and representing it outside its borders; and no authority above that of 
the state— (Metthews, 1997:56) are thought to govern the relations among the 
states as well as security related matters; all defense preparations were designed 
accordingly. States have spent billions of dollars on defense, from large armies to 
small elite units, from simple equipment to the most sophisticated missile shields 
like the US has been trying to implement, all aiming at one particular, similar end: 
securing the territory of the state against any threats to state sovereignty.  
 
According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) the world 
spent $1339 billion in 2007—a real-terms increase of 6 per cent over 2006 and of 
45 per cent since 1998. This corresponded to 2.5 per cent of world gross domestic 
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product (GDP) and $202 for each person in the world. (The $1339 billion includes 
all current and capital expenditure on the armed forces, including peace keeping 
forces, defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense 
projects, paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for 
military operations and military space activities)3 At this point a critical question 
arises: Do all these efforts make the world, in general, and states, in particular, safer 
and more secure? The answer seems to be “NO”, as scholars and policy makers 
have begun to recognize that successful territorial security does not necessarily 
ensure the security of citizens within the state; a fact to which the examples of 
North Korea and Rwanda can attest, and for which Global terrorism stands as a 
firm example (King and Murray, 2002). This dislodging of territory as the total 
focus for security diversified the subjects brought under the umbrella of 
International Relations, putting issues like environmental change and its subsequent 
consequences like global warming, droughts, lack of food, lack of clean water, 
extinction of species and global epidemics like bird flu, swine flu or AIDS etc, onto 
the agenda and clearly signaled a transformation in the system and its states.  
 
More and more International Relations scholars have started to question the states’ 
capacity to act in accordance with its traditionally assumed roles, as defined by the 
Westphalian order (Ohmae 1995, Wendt 2003, Sørensen 2001, Sørensen 2004). It 
is not uncommon to see the argument that the power and capacity of states have 
                                                 
3
 Military expenditure concept also includes: personnel expenditure like; all expenditures on current 
personnel, military and civil, retirement pensions of military personnel, social services for personnel 
and their families, operations and maintenance, procurement, military research and development, 
military construction, military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Such area like; 
Civil defense, current expenditure for previous military activities, veterans benefits, demobilization, 
conversion of arms production facilities, destruction of weapons are excluded. SIPRI Recent trends 
in military expenditure, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Available at: 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_trends.html  
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diminished at the hands of Globalization, which has created an increasing and 
deepening transformation in the states and in the system in general.  
 
Defining Globalization is as difficult, if not more, as defining Security. That is why 
as, Aydınlı (2005: 231) explains, “Books on the topic of globalization often carry a 
tone of apology for not being able to offer a precise and generally agreed-on 
definition.” (Aydınlı, 2005: 232) Instead of striving to find a definition to a term 
that is so widely contested and has so many differing interpretations, it is more 
productive to identify the dimensions that give globalization the meaning it has for 
the world now and to mention different positions taken against globalization.  
 
Globalization has become the most widely used – and misused – keyword in 
disputes in recent years, but it is also one of the most rarely defined, nebulous, 
misunderstood, yet politically effective concepts (Beck, 2000). It signals a number 
of different instruments and players in contrast to International Relations’ exclusive 
focus on states. First of all, globalization emphasizes a world-wide or global, rather 
than national, context and it suggests a process oriented “processual” approach to 
world affairs; we are dealing with realities in motion on the global scale (Gillian 
1996). Issues, actors, and instruments which can be called the variables of the 
global system are neither static nor close to transformation. Globalization is a lot 
more dynamic and incorporative than International relations, which only recognizes 
the relations between the defined entities of states as crucial for assessing what is 
happening in the world (Gillian 1996). 
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In the final analysis, the effects of globalization are diverse and pervasive in every 
day life, in International relations and on Security. Globalization, as a process and 
as a source of transformation, poses itself as a challenge to states given that it 
complicates already existing security issues and also brings new issues for the 
states to handle. Naturally, the same challenge applies to the International Relations 
discipline and Security Studies as globalization and its subsequent events 
challenges tradition thinking and pushes the discipline for a new line of thought for 
the new issues and threats at hand.  
 
As it is important to understand the notion of Security in order to be able to discuss 
the security culture of a country, let alone the transformation from one form to 
another, the next section will provide a basic discussion on Security, followed by an 
exploration of different approaches that are trying to explain Security.  
 
 
2.2 Theoretical Approaches to Security and Transformation 
 
2.2.1 The [Neo]-Realist Approach to Security 
 
With the outbreak of World War II (WWII), Idealism lost a lot of ground to 
Realism, which had come into the International Relations discourse in response to 
the need to study International politics as they are, not as humans feel they should 
be. “People cannot, by wishing politics were different, make them so because they 
do not have the power; therefore, they must work within the existing power 
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structure” was the main rationale behind the formulation of a “Realist” view of 
International Relations (Barkin, 2003). 
 
The concept of Security has traditionally been merged into the concept of National 
Security. This applies to the Realist approach in general, with its emphasis on the 
military capabilities of states. The end of the second greatest war waged on earth 
brought a new order to the world in which most of the world’s states aligned in two 
camps. Throughout the great rivalry of East and West, world affairs and 
international relations were seen through the prevailing ideological and military 
glasses worn by the superpowers of the time; the United States of America (USA) 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (or Союз Советских 
Социалистических Республик - Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik).   
 
The military rivalry between the superpowers, who owned the means to ensure the 
destruction of the other, provided strong cement for state oriented world affairs and 
strengthened the position of the state vis-à-vis any non-state actor in the system. 
This very dangerous time during the Cold War years, which strengthened the state 
and placed it at the center of all human affairs, inevitably empowered the state-
centric International Relations approach; Realism. 
 
Realism offers a reasonably parsimonious theory that explains a large portion of 
world politics, as it claims (Hughes, 2000). Briefly, realism argues that states are 
the main unit of analysis as they are the main actors of the international system and 
states are motivated by power and security. In this state-centric evaluation of 
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International relations, everything revolves around the state and states take 
precedence over individuals who, in fact, make up the state.  
 
In dealing with realism there are several concepts that need particular attention as 
they constitute the core of the realist view of International Relations and through 
those concepts the realist approach, with its variants, claims to explain the current 
situation and predict future actions.  
 
The “State” is at the very center of the realist view of International Relations. For 
realism, states are unitary actors that speak with one voice and act without internal 
dissent on interstate issues (as if no interest groups compete within the states) 
(Hughes, 2000). States are taken for granted and they are regarded are rational 
actors which will make rational calculations to ensure their security and survival in 
the anarchic international system.  
 
The State creates a hierarchical environment for humans to live in free from 
internal and external danger. In this environment, humans feel themselves to be safe 
and secure, so that they can concentrate on other aspects of life and focus on 
production and development. Within this structured, hierarchical environment, 
people know that there is a body with the relevant instruments to protect them from 
any type of predator. In exchange for this protection humans submit to the authority 
of the state and recognize it as the legitimate authority that has the power and the 
right to use force whenever it deems it necessary. While states provide this highly 
structured, tightly hierarchical order for its members, states do not exist in a similar 
structure with other states. Humans dwelling within a particular state recognize that 
17 
 
state as the highest authority; however states are autonomous entities that are not 
subordinate to any higher authority. This brings in the notion of “Anarchy” to the 
realist approach.  
 
In realism, Anarchy does not mean a totally chaotic environment in utter disorder. 
Rather, it means the lack of a central authority to which all states would submit and 
recognize as a higher and legitimate power. As Mearsheimer (2001) suggests, the 
prevalence of anarchy in the international system is one of the bedrock assumptions 
of Realism; however this does not mean the system is riven by disorder 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). In fact, the notion of anarchy is seen as an ordering principle, 
which says that the system is compromised of independent states with no central 
authority or government above them (Mearsheimer, 2001). Anarchy is a crucial 
factor in understanding the system as well as state behavior. Within the state, 
members of the society are subordinates to the state and they constitute a 
community ruled by the state. On the other hand, the international system is made 
up of states that are sovereign units and a community of sovereigns is no 
community at all (Kurland, 1987). 
   
To demonstrate how the presence of anarchy influences the system and the units 
within the system, Waltz (1979) points out several differences in his comparison of 
domestic and international structures: 
 
“Differences between national and international structures are 
reflected in the ways the units of each system define their ends 
and develop the means for reaching them. In anarchic realms like 
units co-act. In hierarchic realms, unlike units interact. In anarchic 
realm, the units are functionally similar and tend to remain so. 
Like units work to maintain a measure of independence and may 
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even strive for autarchy. In hierarchical realm, the units are 
differentiated, and they tend to increase the extent of their 
specialization. Differentiated units become closely 
interdependent…” 
  
Even though anarchy itself does not constitute the sole reason for violence and war 
in the international system, for Waltz (1979) the existence of anarchy and the 
absence of government are associated with the threat of violence. How would states 
respond to the threat of violence? How would an individual, a European or a Turk, 
an inhabitant of Ankara or Berlin respond to the threat of violence? Most likely, in 
the face of danger or threat, he or she would call the police or write a petition to the 
office of the public prosecutor. In general, any individual under threat would go to 
the higher authority to ask for protection and security. There is no higher authority 
that states answer to or from which they can seek protection. Under this condition, 
the only option left for the state is to look for ways to provide its own security, 
which brings in another concept of Realism: “Self help”.  
 
Self-help simply means taking care of one’s own, in the context of states, this 
means taking care of your own security needs. The Self help notion intensifies the 
competition among states and generates a conflict prone system. Even though states 
come together under alliances, for realism those occasions are still examples of 
helping self.  
 
To help themselves, states accumulate power and power constitutes an important 
aspect of Realism and Security. Power, for Waltz (1979), provides four things to 
the states: 
“First, power provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy 
in the face of force that others wield. Second, greater power 
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permits wider ranges of action, while leaving the outcomes of 
action uncertain…. Third, the more powerful enjoy wider margins 
of safety in dealing with the less powerful and have more to say 
about which games will be played and how…. Fourth, great 
power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the 
ability to act for its sake…” (Waltz, 1979:47) 
 
 
2.2.1.1 Transformation of Security Culture and Neo-realism 
 
When it comes to discussing security culture and its transformation under the 
auspices of Neo-realism, one faces major challenges. First of all, Security culture 
by definition, is a product of Constructivist perspective and this perspective 
explains the origins security culture with individuals actions of the actors, namely 
security culture is a constructed product of agents not a dictation of the 
international system (therefore it evolves and transforms independent of system 
level changes such as a change in polarity). Security culture is shaped by the 
particular history, geography and experiences of a particular state. It is influenced 
by outside factors however it is also deeply attached to the domestic features of the 
state. However, Neo-realist tradition will deny the influence of domestic sphere and 
will reject state-specific explanations, as for this perspective States, no matter what 
happens, think and act in the same way, as they are not different from each other 
and as they all seek the same ends (Waltz, 1979). 
 
Secondly, Neo-realists explain “the change” at the systemic level based on the 
distribution of capabilities which is defined in terms of power4, which means if any 
change will happen in the security equation; this will be due to the fall or rise of 
                                                 
4
 For detailed discussion of change, power and capabilities at the system level see Mearsheimer, J. J. 
2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. 
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new powers. A transformation of security understanding is not really relevant for 
Neo-realist security perspective.  
 
2.2.1.2 Epilogue to [neo]-Realist Security 
 
Even though realism, which was backed by the unique conditions of the Cold War, 
and was strengthened by its parsimony and effective concepts, prevailed for a long 
time, it did not last as the single interpretation of interstate affairs. Several variants 
of Realism came into being as scholars of this school began to focus on diverse 
aspects of international relations or interpreted state behavior in different ways. All 
those variants, from classical to neo or offensive to defensive, accept the basic 
tenets of realism while emphasizing different dimensions, like human nature versus 
the system or states adopting an offensive strategy in order to dominate the other 
states or a defensive strategy in order to ensure their security.  
 
For realists, the meaning of “Security is subsumed under the rubric of power. 
Conceptually, it is synonymous with the external security of the state, which is to 
be achieved by increasing military capability” (Tickner, 1995: 177). With the dawn 
of the 1990’s, critics of Realism began to raise their voices. They heavily criticized 
the realist preoccupation with cross-border conflict and military power defined in 
terms of the interests and security of the great powers, for offering a worldview that 
was a poor fit with the reality of the time (Tickner, 1995). Realism’s decline in the 
1990s was coupled with developments in the international arena that seemed to 
provide strong support for alternative approaches. The Soviet Union’s voluntary 
retrenchment and subsequent demise, the continuation of Western European 
21 
 
integration in the absence American-Soviet competition, the wave of 
democratization and economic liberalization throughout the former Soviet Union, 
Eastern Europe and the developing world the improbability of war between the 
great powers and the developing world, and the improbability of war between the 
great powers themselves, all made realism appear outdated (Jervis, 2002). 
 
The new millennium brought newer crises and threats to the international system 
that seem to make Realism relevant again. Moreover, it should be noted that not all 
states or regions are experiencing the same level of positive progress in terms of 
war and security. Therefore, the Realist Security understanding still holds a 
relatively strong position.  
 
2.1.2 Liberalism and Security 
 
The liberal tradition in thinking about Security dates as far back as the philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, who emphasized the importance of republican constitutions in 
generating peace within the system and among the states (Kornelia, 2008). In 
today’s International Relations and diplomacy, using the concept of “Road Map”, 
which implies a plan of action detailing the steps for the ultimate resolution of a 
certain problem or conflict, is very common when parties are trying to resolve a 
dispute (Road map for solving Israeli-Palestine conflict, Turkish-Armenian 
problems or Cyprus issue etc). In this regard, Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” is his road 
map for peace, with its preliminary and definitive articles as well as its guarantees 
for peace.  
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To understand how Liberalism sees the system and how it interprets the concept of 
“Security”, it is useful to examine the articles of the Perpetual Peace, through which 
Kant explicitly and implicitly describes what peace and security is all about. The 
preliminary articles are: 
 
1. “No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid . . . if it was made with a 
secret reservation . . . for a future war.” 
Realism dictates that a self help notion prevails in the system. In such a system, a 
state can not trust any other actor as there is no higher place to look for justice or 
protection. With the first preliminary article, Kant addresses the lack of trust issue 
and tries to prevent this from becoming an obstacle to Peace. A lack of trust will 
lead to an abundant fear of cheating, which will result in a lack of cooperation as 
each side attempts to gain and secure as much as possible; this behavior will trigger 
the other side to do the same, leading to the eventual failure of peace.   
 
2. “No independently existing state, whether it is large or small, may be acquired 
by or come under domination of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase 
or gift or any other way of exchange.” 
A state is not, like the ground which it occupies, a piece of property (patrimonium). 
It is a society of men whom no one else has any right to command or to dispose of 
except the state itself. Incorporating the state into another state contradicts the idea 
of the original contract, without which no legitimate right over a people can be 
conceived (Smith, 1992). 
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3. “Standing armies (miles perpetuus) will gradually be abolished altogether.” 
Almost all organisms have their own defensive mechanisms; for states, these 
mechanisms are armies. However, keeping such a power always at hand brings with 
it the possibility of resorting to force to resolve differences. Combined with other 
articles, armies will not be needed for security in a system where trust prevails and 
threats are eliminated.  
 
4. “National debt shall not be contracted in connection with the external affairs of 
the state.”  
War is a great expense for the state. An important amount of financial resources are 
required to undertake a war against other parties. If money is always available for 
this purpose it will create greater inclination towards resorting to warfare. Therefore, 
providing credit and money to fighting parties is an important source of problems 
that needs to be eliminated for perpetual peace and security.  
 
5. “No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution, government and affairs of 
another state.” 
Nothing can justify intervention into another state’s affairs. It will constitute a 
negative example for the rest of the world. This aspect of Kantian understanding is 
a source of debate when it comes to humanitarian intervention. In traditional terms, 
security threats are directed towards the state from outside and states provide 
security for themselves and for their citizens, however, in today’s world the state 
itself might become a security threat, not only to other states, but also primarily to 
its own citizens. “Failed states” are a prominent example of this. For Kant, Security 
can be provided for all as long as every state deals only with its own affairs and 
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refrains from intervening in the affairs of others; yet a non-traditional 
understanding of Security will not be served in this way.  
 
6. “No State shall, during war, permit such acts of hostility which would make 
mutual confidence in the subsequent peace impossible: these intolerable acts are 
the employment of assassins to exterminate the leaders, and incitement to treason 
in the adversary.” 
Warfare is mostly about violence, yet still there has to be justice in war. In the 
occasion of a war, the aim should be resolving the problem by making the other 
side accept your terms, not annihilating the other side nor inflicting irreparable 
damage. Such extreme acts will demolish trust in the system and will increase the 
fear of other states. Therefore, states, for the sake of earning the upper hand in 
current affairs, should not resort to ways that will destroy security and peace in the 
future.5 
 
2.2.2.1 Democratic Peace Theory 
 
In 1983, Doyle published “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” which 
drew attention to the existence of the democratic peace (DP). Doyle’s theory is 
predicated on the idea that states that adhere to liberal principles “enjoy a separate 
peace among them, but are likely to wage war against non-liberal states (Lynn-
                                                 
5
 Definitive articles of the Perpetual Peace are: One: The Civil Constitution of Every State Should 
Be Republican, Two: The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free States, Three: 
The Law of World Citizenship Shall Be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality. In addition 
to preliminary and definitive articles, there are two supplements that are A. Of the Guarantee for 
Perpetual Peace and B. Secret Article for Perpetual Peace. Kant, Immanuel. 1992. Perpetual Peace. 
M. Campell Smith, trans. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.   
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Jones 1999, xiv).” This philosophy was set forth by Immanuel Kant in 1795 and, 
for Doyle, Kant’s notion of the “Perpetual Peace” provides the best explanation for 
the DP (Lynn-Jones 1999, xv). He proposes a theory based on structure-centered 
liberalism, which emphasizes the domestic institutions of states in order to explain 
their international behavior. There are three structural dimensions of the domestic 
polity: political structure – regime type (democracy vs. dictatorship); economic 
structure – type of economic system (capitalist vs. command economy); and 
domestic social structures – commonly shared ideas on truth or appropriateness 
(ideologies, identities, etc). Unlike other DP theories, the key for Doyle is the 
state’s commitment to liberalism, the essential principle of which is freedom of the 
individual (Russett 1999, 59).  
 
The other “founding” DP theories are generally divided into two categories: 
structural and normative (Owen, 1994). The structural theory holds that the 
constraints within a democracy, such as checks and balances, division of power and 
public interest, will reduce the likelihood of war. Leaders must “ensure broad 
popular support, manifested in various institutions of government,” which means 
they are unlikely to propose any war they know will be unpopular (Russett 1993, 
101). These same leaders must run for reelection, so they are unlikely to wage a 
war they don’t think they can win. Additionally, mobilizing for war is a time 
consuming process in a democracy and it is also a public endeavor, so other states 
can easily ascertain their intentions. Perceptions matter because, if democratic 
leaders generally assume that all other democratic leaders will be like they are, slow 
and reluctant to fight, then they will not fear an attack from that country. They will 
likely settle their disagreements without war (Russett 1993). Violent conflicts will 
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be frequent with non-democracies, however, because non-democratic leaders know 
that democratic leaders are constrained and will push democracies to make 
concessions over issues of conflict. Democracies may respond with large-scale 
violence rather than make the concessions (Russett 1993). 
 
Normative theories, on the other hand, hold that there is a powerful norm within 
democratic countries of non-violence toward other democracies. Democratic 
governments generally guarantee rights of self-determination for their citizens and 
engage in non-violent conflict resolution domestically. Therefore, citizens in one 
democracy will respect the rights of citizens in another democracy and apply 
domestic conflict resolution practices to the international level; this results in a 
“transnational democratic culture” (Russett 1993). Again, perception is crucial 
because this norm does not apply to non-democratic countries; they are presumed to 
be aggressive enemies. Non-democracies use violence or violent threats to govern 
their people, so it is assumed that they would do so at the international level; hence, 
the norm of non-violence does not apply (Russett 1993).      
 
The DP has “nearly become a truism” and has been referred to as the “closest thing 
we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations” (Owen, 1994). 
Its weaknesses, therefore, focus on issues of definition, measurement and causation. 
How one defines ‘democracy’ and ‘war’ is pretty subjective and this “provides a 
temptation to tautology” (Owen, 1994). Scholars can easily define and measure 
these terms so that, when empirically tested, the DP proposition is upheld. More 
importantly, DP scholars have failed to identify the causal mechanism (thereby 
proving that the connection between democracy and peace is not just spurious) 
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behind the theory (Lynn-Jones 1999, xi-xii). Even DP theorists, like John Owen, 
admit that they “do not really know the causal mechanism behind the democratic 
peace [and this] means we cannot be certain the peace is genuine” (Owen, 1994). 
DP scholars must come to a consensus on definition and measurement issues so that 
they can nail down the causal mechanism(s). 
 
2.2.2.2 Transformation of Security/Culture and Liberalism 
 
When it comes to the transformation of Security as a concept and the understanding 
of security in general, Liberalism is more open and permissive than Realism. 
However, as Liberalism also operates with similar parameters as Realism when it 
comes to explaining the basics of the international order, it will not predict a radical 
transformation in the security understanding of a state. For Liberalism, states 
remain the dominant actors compared to sub- or supra-national actors and a real-
politik security understanding with a Liberal flavor will remain in control of the 
system in general and security understanding in particular.  
 
Liberalism suffered the labels of idealism and even utopianism because of its 
optimistic views on peace and Security in the world. Liberalism claims that security 
can be achieved without racing or defeating others and peace can be established if 
certain values and norms are achieved. Even though Liberalism shares important 
aspects with Realism, like the prominence of states as the most important actor in 
the system, there are certain differences as far as how states, politics within the 
states and the behavior of states are understood. For Liberalism, states are important 
actors but not the only ones. Non-state actors play a part in the system as well and 
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recent events demonstrate that non-state actors might become a major source of 
insecurity for states; the provision of security depends on how they are handled and 
accommodated within the system.  
 
Another difference is how Liberalism sees the power of the system over the states. 
Even though the system is the environment in which states exist and interact, their 
behavior is not dictated solely by the system. Their behavior is determined by their 
preferences, not only by their power and status in the system; the Turkish decision 
to abolish the use of anti-personnel land mines exemplifies this. Anti-personnel 
land mines might be seen as practical and useful for a state that has extended land 
borders with its neighbors as the placement of mines might generate power for the 
owner. Yet Turkey preferred not to place those mines on its territory anymore, nor 
store them for future use, by becoming a signatory country to the Ottawa treaty. It 
was not the idea of power, but the preferences of the Turkish state (in line with its 
Europeanization process) that made Turkey decide on such a course of action.   
 
In conclusion, Liberalism, even though is employs similar views on states’ 
prominence in the system, provides an alternative outlook to states and Security by 
including the non-states actors of the system and by acknowledging the power of 
states’ preferences in determining their actions. This definitely influences how it 
understands and provides Security for states and the rest of the actors.  
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2.2.3 Critical theory and Critical Security 
 
Seeing the immense destructiveness of World War I (WWI), scholars, scientists and 
educated minds of the time felt the need for research to find ways to establish peace 
on earth, looking to understand why wars took place and conflicts occurred so as to 
prevent them from happening. Liberalism dominated the scene with its emphasis on 
humans, cooperation and economic interdependence. The rise of fascist regimes 
and the outbreak of the WWII replaced the optimism of Liberalism with the 
pessimism of Realism. Liberalism and Realism, as the mainstream approaches to 
International Relations, dominated the field. On the other hand, alternative and 
voices that are critical of the mainstream did not stop joining the International 
Relations debates, Critical Theory being one. Compared to Realism and Liberalism, 
Critical theory and critical security studies are relatively new as it started to exert 
more influence from 1990’s onwards. However according to Bilgin (2005:89) the 
ideas on which critical security studies are based and the calls for alternative 
outlooks to those infected by the Cold War, goes back way before than the 1990’s, 
as Cold War categories have restricted the ways of thinking about and doing 
security for the International Relations field (Bilgin, 2008). Linklater’s (2007:45) 
writings support this view as he claims Marxian-inspired critical theory has 
exercised significant influence on International Relations theory and has emerged 
as a serious alternative to orthodox views in the International Relations field.  
 
The important question to answer here is “Why Critical Theory is critical, and what 
is it critical of? While it is impossible to fit the whole of the Critical Security 
literature here in this chapter, briefly, one might say that it is critical compared to 
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“mainstream” theories because, as a social theory, critical theory refuses to take the 
outside world as a given and tries to question the very foundations upon which the 
accepted assumptions about the world are based. It denies the applicability of the 
empirical approaches to the social world and questions the reliability of the 
knowledge generated via unreliable methodology. In terms of International 
Relations and for the concept of Security, Critical theory questions basic concepts 
like State, Interest, Power or the meaning of Security, which are accepted as they 
are and assumed to remain static by the traditional International Relations 
approaches (Realism and Liberalism).  
 
Critical theory explains the subjective nature of security and emphasizes the fact 
that security is bound to the inter-subjective creation of humans, societies and 
states. Security is what people/states make of it. “It is an epiphenomenon inter-
subjectively created. Different world views and discourses about politics deliver 
different views and discourses about security” (Booth, 1994). 
 
The Welsh school of Critical Security Studies prefers “politicizing security” and 
Bilgin (2008) puts forward three arguments (analytical, strategic and ethico-
political) to demonstrate the merits of this attitude. First of all, addressing non-
traditional security threats (such as HIV/AIDS) as “global security threats” helps to 
mobilize more resources and raise more awareness (analytical argument), which 
secures better results in terms of remedies for the problem. Secondly, in order not to 
leave the existential threats merely at the hands of the state’s elite, whose way of 
handling those threats will be based on zero-sum games and traditional military 
methods (strategic argument), “politicizing security” is the key element. Lastly, 
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“politicizing security” (ethico-political argument) broadens the security agenda, 
that used to be based on the policy preferences of the defining elite, to include the 
other portions of the society and their security concerns. 
 
In the final analysis, critical theory is critical of power politics as power politics and 
its affiliated theories are the creations of powerful groups/states that use them to 
protect their acquired power. Being critical of the traditional lines of thought about 
how security is understood and what is included in it, Critical security studies put 
forward the argument that the discipline of International Relations is the evolution 
of human consciousness about living globally and politics on a global scale; and 
“Emancipation” is the major organizing principle. Booth summarizes the 
emancipation as “Bread, Knowledge and Freedom” in which bread symbolizes 
unobstructed access to materials and the satisfaction of material needs, knowledge 
symbolizes freedom from lies and information distortion and, finally, freedom 
symbolizes freedom from oppression (Booth, 2009).  
 
2.2.4 The English School, International Society and Security 
 
“The foundation of English School theory is the idea that international system, 
international society and world society all exist simultaneously, both as objects of 
discussion and as aspects of international reality” (Buzan, 2004). The key terms for 
the English School are “Order” and “International Society”. Bull and Watson 
(1984:1) describe International Society as such: 
 
“By an international society we mean a group of states (or more 
generally a group of interdependent political communities) which 
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not merely for a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a 
necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have 
established by dialogue and consent common rules and 
institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their 
common interest in maintaining these arrangements” 
 
 
 
In the last twenty years, with the writings of Bull, Wight, Linklater, Jones, 
Suganami, Dunne and several others, the English School earned itself a place in 
academic debates as an alternative approach to understanding International 
Relations. Linklater (2006) mentions three dimensions or “inter-related 
orientations” in the English School’s way of investigating and evaluating 
international affairs. Those three orientations, he labels as: “Structural, Functional 
and Historical” and he gives Manning’s The nature of International Society (1975) 
(Structural), Bull’s famous Anarchical Society (1977) (Structural and Functional), 
Vincent’s Non-intervention and International Order (1974) (Functional), Wight’s 
System of States (1977) (Historical) and Buzan and Little’s International Systems in 
World History (2000) (Historical), as academic works outlining those orientations. 
 
Bull’s well known definition of International Society indicates that international 
society exists because states are conscious of certain common interests and values 
and they consider themselves to be bound by a common set of rules; these rules 
define the nature, and the modes, of relations in the International Society as well as 
the institutions that regulate those relations among the members of the society 
(Dunne and Wheeler, 1996). Security needs to be understood in this context. For 
the English School, security constitutes a normative value and thus is subject to 
change from place to place and from time to time. For instance, what security 
meant for pre-historic cavemen is different than what it meant for medieval 
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merchants of Europe. It meant one thing for Machiavelli and something else for 
Grotius. Similarly, security is defined by the society living within the state and 
whatever makes them feel insecure and unsafe, influences how they perceive and 
define security. This logic implies that security is prone to transformation in line 
with the transformation in the society’s interpretation of security and perception of 
threat. 
An important problem surrounding the English School is that the boundaries 
between the English School and traditionalist theories such as Liberalism and 
Realism are not clear when it comes to certain issues. The English School and more 
specifically, the Pluralist factions within the English School, and main stream 
theories share common views on the nature of sovereignty and centrality of state. 
On the other hand, Solidarism factions of the English School support the idea that 
the values, identity and individual cultures of the states matters on the grand scale, a 
point of common ground with liberal theory. 
  
All in all, security is an important common and normative value for the English 
School and the security of the whole society is important for the security of the 
individual members of the international society. What security means for the 
society is bound to change depending on the time and space. Therefore, it is 
comfortable to say that security culture is open to change.  
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2.2.5 Constructivism and Constructivist Security 
 
“All the world's a stage,  
And all the men and women merely players: 
They have their exits and their entrances;”  
 
says the Lord Jaques in the famous Shakespearean play As You Like It (Knowles, 
1997 translation, Act 2 Scene 7). For Realism, all the world’s a stage, which is 
organized around a certain structure with certain rules and only certain players are 
allowed to act on that particular stage. Like a Victorian play and Globe Theater 
actors, states make their entrances and exits to the stage and play their part on the 
stage. To whom they play, or under what conditions, with what implications, they 
perform does not matter because how they will play and how the game will proceed 
is defined by the material contribution of the script and the facilities provided by 
the stage.  
 
For Realism, the play is the same play and will produce the same outcome (in this 
context, the same reactions from the audience) no matter where, when or how it is 
played. On the other hand, Constructivism disagrees with this line of thought on the 
basis that how the play will be received is not only determined by the quality of the 
writing, and the excellence of the acting, but also by the context in which the play is 
performed, the kind of audience, their values and expectations about the play and 
the subject of the play. In other words, the outcome of the play and the reaction of 
the audience will not only depend on the material qualities of the play (such as the 
quality of the script, the performance of the actors, the lights, the music etc…) but 
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also on social factors affecting the players and the audience. In addition to the 
material dimension, Constructivism adds the social dimension to understanding the 
actions of states; whose primacy in the structure of world politics is also accepted 
by constructivism. 
  
Constructivism operates through two main assumptions about the nature and 
structure of the agent and environment. For constructivism, agents are not given nor 
are they fixed. Rather, they are socially constructed. Even though those agents 
constitute a material existence, what they come to mean is actualized though social 
interaction. Another assumption of constructivism brings in the social dimension to 
the environment of states, in addition to the material dimension, when it comes to 
understanding states’ behaviors. In this sense, constructivism claims that material 
capabilities are important and undeniable; however, they gain meaning through 
social interactions and the social environment of the states. In other words, the 
same material capability is likely to acquire different meanings for different agents 
(depending on the social interactions between those agents and their social 
environments), and thus it will produce dissimilar behaviors.  
 
To exemplify the case, one might look at the differences in the nuclear relationships 
of the US: their tense relationship with Iran, versus their agreements with India or 
Israel. From a purely material perspective, the US would be expected to oppose the 
acquisition of nuclear material, technology and weapons by any other state as it is 
an apocalyptic weapon whose destruction is beyond imagination; since their 
creation nuclear weapons have only been used twice - once in Hiroshima and once 
in Nagasaki at the end of WWII. Given that the US is the only nation ever to 
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employ nuclear weaponry and that the destructive capability of today’s nuclear 
technology far outstrips that of the 1940s, a restrictive and non-permissive attitude 
from the US is to be expected. But, the real situation portrays a very different 
picture.  
 
The US shared its nuclear technology and know-how with the United Kingdom 
(UK) in the past and, despite the ambiguity over the existence of Israel’s nuclear 
arsenal, the US seems to be comfortable with the idea of Israel possessing nuclear 
technology and nuclear weapons. During the G.W. Bush administration, the US 
signed agreements with India, who is another nuclear power, to further its 
cooperation with India in the field of nuclear technology. 6  Against such a 
background, Iran enters the picture with ambitions to achieve nuclear goals, which 
mean different things to different sides of the story.  
 
From the Iranian perspective, Iran, though an energy rich country, is trying to 
diversify its energy resources by adding the nuclear option to its energy portfolio. 
Even though nuclear energy is not an immediate necessity for Iran, Tehran thinks 
that it has to act now to invest in various other sources of energy than fossil fuels, 
                                                 
6
 The technology opportunities India will gain out of this agreement: India would be eligible to buy 
U.S. dual-use nuclear technology, including materials and equipment that could be used to enrich 
uranium or reprocess plutonium, potentially creating the material for nuclear bombs. It would also 
receive imported fuel for its nuclear reactors. Terms of the deal: India agrees to allow inspectors 
from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the United Nations' nuclear watchdog 
group, access to its civilian nuclear program. India commits to signing an Additional Protocol 
(PDF)-which allows more intrusive IAEA inspections-of its civilian facilities. India agrees to 
continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. India commits to strengthening the security of 
its nuclear arsenals.  India works toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) with 
the United States banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. India agrees to 
prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that don't possess them and 
to support international nonproliferation efforts. U.S. companies will be allowed to build nuclear 
reactors in India and provide nuclear fuel for its civilian energy program. (An approval by the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group lifting the ban on India has also cleared the way for other countries to 
make nuclear fuel and technology sales to India.) Pan, Esther. October 2 2008. " The U.S.-India 
Nuclear Deal." Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations Publication. 
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to guarantee its energy independence in the future (Sahimi et all., 2003). On the 
other hand, Washington perceives Tehran’s nuclear program as a threat and does 
not accept the Iranian thesis of “nuclear technology research for civilian peaceful 
purposes” (Rice, 2006). In order to prevent Iran from developing independent 
nuclear technology, the Western bloc has offered Iran the provision of nuclear 
material in exchange for Iran ceasing its nuclear material enrichment process. This 
offer does not satisfy the Iranian side who sees the purchase of the most critical 
material for this kind of energy production from outside sources as contrary to its 
plans of energy independence. The situation has been a dead-lock so far with its ups 
and downs and fluctuating negotiations. Even though there are efforts to negotiate a 
settlement of the issue, it seems there will only be more tension and delay in the 
coming days.  
 
But no matter the outcome, the fact that the US government is signing treaties to 
expand its cooperation with India in the field of nuclear technology while 
simultaneously threatening Iran for its nuclear activities and quest for nuclear 
capability is difficult to explain solely on the material terms of a realist world. 
Constructivism proposes that in the Iran-US nuclear tension, the social dimensions 
are instrumental in explaining the problem and without including them it is not 
possible to get the clear and complete picture. The social interaction of Iran with its 
environment and specifically with the US and Israel, makes the US more suspicious 
about its material capabilities and makes it more reluctant to agree to Iran’s 
improvement of its material capabilities; Iran’s intentions are not clear to outside 
observers due to its imbalanced, fluctuating and uneasy social connections with the 
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outside world. The very same material capability acquires different meanings from 
one unit to other which is determined by the social interaction between the units.  
 
In order to comprehend the fundamental International Relations concepts as 
elucidated by Constructivism, Alexander Wendt’s famous article, Anarchy Is what 
States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, published in 1992 is 
an important source of information. In his article, Wendt points out the differences 
between rational theories (by which he means Realism and Liberalism) and 
Constructivism and by doing so he generates an outline of constructivism and its 
arguments on important concepts such as anarchy, states and security. While 
Waltzian Neo-realism reads the system through the prism of the structure, that is 
characterized by prevalence of anarchy and distribution of power, and Keohaneian 
(and Nye) Neo-liberalism relies on “units’ complex learning from each other” and 
the “interaction between them” as the determining factor in states’ actions, 
Wendtian Constructivism (Wendt, 1992) claim that constructivist scholars  
 
“share a cognitive, inter-subjective conception of process in 
which identities and interests are endogenous (created or 
generated within the system, eligible to be derived from within) to 
interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioral one in which they 
are exogenous (originating from outside or derived externally)”.  
 
Wendt’s famous statement that “Anarchy is what States make of it”, in its most 
uncomplicated sense, means that anarchy is a material fact, it exists out there but 
what it will mean, what kind of reactions or feelings it will arouse in the units/states 
is determined by the social interaction among those units/states. This means that 
anarchy, by itself, does not pose a positive or a negative picture and what it will 
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turn into depends on the actions of the units/states. Here, states are not passive 
recipients in the structure; rather they influence the structure as it influences them.  
 
Constructivism emphasizes the inter-subjective (Inter-subjectively held as Ruggie, 
1982 details) nature of identity and the interests of the states. The identity of a state, 
and the interests that are driven by that identity should not be taken for granted nor 
are they fixed forever. Those socially constructed concepts do not transcend the 
time and place and do not remain intact, unchanged while it is in interaction with 
other units/states. Identity and the interests of the state are subject to transformation 
through inside and outside influences, triggered by domestic or external input (for 
example, Turkey’s European Union (EU) accession process or the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran).  
 
“Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost 
with preservation or "security" of the self. Concepts of security therefore differ in 
the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with 
the other” (Wendt, 1992). In this regard, similar to the formation of identity, the 
transformation of identity implicitly signals a better preservation of security for the 
self and a better adaptation of self for the changing condition. As security is 
genuinely dependent on how identity is formed or transformed (and therefore how 
interests are defined), security is bound to different interpretations and will yield to 
transformation. Unlike Realism or Liberalism, with which constructivism does 
agree on various concepts, the constructivist security understanding provides room 
for future changes that might take place in a state’s security behavior; it is not only 
fixed to interstate-external threats.   
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Finally, Wendt identifies three security systems:  
 
a) Competitive Security System; which can be identified as a Hobbesian type of 
system with a fixation on relative gains. Symptoms of this system can be portrayed 
as a constant fear of others, lack of trust of other units in the system, the near 
impossibility of cooperation and dilemmatic security behavior (one’s action 
negating the others) 
 
b) Individualistic Security System; which can be identified as neoliberal type of 
system with fixations on absolute gains. Symptoms of such a system would be; 
self-centric/self-regarding security mentality, less attention to others and possibility 
of cooperation. 
 
c) Cooperative Security System; which can be identified as a Security 
producing/Positive Security type of system with assumptions beyond self-help 
behavior. Symptoms of this system are responsible units, limited differentiation 
between self and other, the possibility of collective security action and a high 
degree of convergence in terms of security identity and interests.   
In conclusion, Constructivism is the key to understand Security Culture as it 
provides the analytical tools to understand how security culture is formed and 
transforms over the time. This thesis evaluates the Turkish security culture and the 
possible transformation of it (European transformation in this case) with a 
constructivist perspective. In the following parts, it tries to explain the historical 
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steps of this evolution and finally looks for a transformation toward European 
security mindset.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
SECURITY UNDESTANDING IN TRANSFORMATION: 
UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE & EXPLAINING THE CHANGE!  
 
 
 
In this section the concepts of “National Security Culture and Identity” (NSCI) will 
be explained. “Security Culture has become fashionable in main stream 
international relations scholarship in the post-Cold War era and an emerging 
consensus in national security policy studies that culture can affect significantly 
grand strategy and state behavior has been noted” (Lantis, 2002). 
 
The section will then move on with the theoretical explanations for and a discussion 
about the transformation that NSCI might undergo. Then it will move on to 
presenting the possible indicators that prove the existence of such a transformation 
and demonstrating three different models proposed to explain such a transformation.  
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3.1 National Security Culture and Identity (NSCI) 
 
Security is quite an important concept not only for states but also for individual 
members of those states. It is in almost all aspects of human life and, especially 
after the end of Cold war, new variants and meanings of security have gained room 
in the realm of security.   
 
To get a full grasp on NSCI, a closer look at the origins of the National Security 
idea is needed. The term National Security first appears in US documents in 1928 
in J. Reuben Clark, Jr.’s Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine; the Under 
Secretary of State for US president Calvin Coolidge was writing to Henry L. 
Stimson, the then Governor-General of the Philippines. In the document the 
national security concept was used with another accompanying term: “Self-
preservation”. In Clark’s words, “… situations challenging our [US] self-
preservation may be handled [in Latin America], and more wisely so, as matters 
affecting the national security and self-preservation of the United States as a great 
power” (Clark, 1928). Here in the Memorandum about Latin America, National 
Security implied the preservation of American presence and power in Latin 
America, which was seen as America’s backyard; the Monroe Doctrine declared the 
region to be closed to external influence or interference.  
 
With the end of WWII, and the escalation of the tension between the forming rival 
blocs, the concept of National Security started to garner more attention and became 
even more powerful in terms of mobilizing society and national resources. In 1947, 
the US congress passed the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, which marked 
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the first use of the National Security concept in US laws and regulations. The NSA 
of 1947 brought about a major reorganization in US defense capabilities and 
institutions. By this act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National 
Security Council (NSC) were formed, whose members included the US President, 
Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and others (like the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency). Furthermore, the Act provided for the 
creation of the Department of Defense by merging the Navy Department with the 
War Department.7 In addition to the NSA of 1947, the US Code includes relevant 
chapters on national security under US Code Title 50 (War and National Defense) 
and Chapter 15 (National Security). These documents exemplify the process of 
inclusion of the concept and how significant it became for the US and, inevitably, 
for the rest of the world.  
 
The Cold War promoted the power of the Realist Approach to international security 
through the escalation of tension between the blocs, imminent nuclear danger, fear 
of total destruction, and anxiety about Soviet subversion or the spread of US 
influence.  
 
For Realism, the Foreign policy of a state is dictated by the national interest “raison 
d'État” and national security imperatives. National security, no matter how clear it 
is for Realism, is found to be rather ambiguous and marvelously elastic, as it has 
been stretched at times to cover a multitude of different issues and activities. Using 
this term so extensively for a variety of areas started with the end of WWII, and 
like a boomerang it is not possible to throw away (Amos, William and Mazarr, 
                                                 
7
 More information about the National Security Act can be found at the official website of the US 
State Department (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17603.htm) and in the United States 
Intelligence community website (http://www.intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml)  
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1999). While Wolfers and Buzan argue about the ambiguity or insufficient 
conceptualization of the term National Security, Morgenthau (1948) puts forward a 
simple and straightforward definition of it, which also demonstrates the Realist 
understanding of the concept: “integrity of the national territory and its institutions”. 
This is very much understandable as Realism tends to attach security to territory 
and expect territorial threats.   
 
In the previous sections, the influence of globalization on security has been 
mentioned. Even though the dimensions, magnitude and depth of this impact is 
contested, in many ways globalization exhibits its influence on security issues and 
the concept of National Security is no exception to that.8 The idea of National 
Security and interstate warfare seems to be an old story for the hyper-globalist 
position, yet as Paul and Lipman (2004) claim, the causal connection between the 
decrease of interstate warfare and a retreat from National Security is yet to be 
empirically established; further research is needed to come up with a more 
explanatory conclusion about the nature of this relationship. 
 
While National Security stands as a crucial dimension in the general framework of 
the states, how does the NSCI fits into the picture? To be able to answer this 
question properly one needs to answer another related question: what should be 
understood from National Culture and Identity?  
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 For a detailed discussion on Globalization and National Security: Paul, Thazha Varkey and Norrin 
M. Ripsman. 2004 “Under Pressure? Globalization and the National Security State,” Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 33(2): 355–380. 
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3.1.1 National Identity 
 
At the very basic level, Identity is defined by the answer to the questions “WHO are 
you?”, WHO are WE? or WHO am I? There are many answers to those questions, 
which also demonstrate that a person can carry multiple identities at the same time. 
“WHO are/am WE/I” question are answered in relation to an “OTHER.” The self 
needs an element of comparison to be able to define itself and the identity is 
constructed in relation to that specified OTHER. The very first identity element a 
person gains (in fact starts with) is the biological gender. Females are defined 
opposite the male “other.” Later on males and females acquire social gender roles 
and adapt those to their identities (or vice versa). This could be followed by tribal 
(for which you have the other tribes around your tribe or tribes that you have 
knowledge of, such as The Afars of Ethiopia-Djibouti versus The Amharas of 
Ethiopia- Shoa and Wallo), religious (Muslim versus Jewish, pagan versus 
Christian or Sunni versus Shi’i) and national identity (Turkish versus American, 
Iraqi versus Kuwaiti, Greek Cypriot versus Turkish Cypriot) dimensions.  
 
National identity can be seen as a product of Nationalism, “unquestionably one of 
the great social forces of modern times which transcended all cultural boundaries 
and still remains a crucial tool of many governments” (Buzan and Segal, 1998:123). 
Ernest Gellner (1983) sees nationalism as the solution found by states to gain and 
control the loyalty of their subjects in a time of shifting loyalties under 
industrialization. As a top-down process, nationalism was instituted by the states 
onto the societies as conscription based national armies proved superior over other 
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forms. For the economic mobilization and development of the state, people needed 
to be more devoted to the state than to a local identity group.    
 
National Identity or the feeling of “WE” requires the fulfillment of several 
preconditions. Anthony D. Smith, Professor Emeritus of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 
identifies 5 fundamental factors in defining National identity. For Smith (1991:14) 
a human group can be defined as a nation when it displays 5 complementary 
features: 
 
a) The idea/ownership of a historic territory, or homeland 
b) Existence of common myths and historical memories 
c) Having a common, mass public culture shared by the members  
d) Existence of common legal rights and duties for all members of the nation 
e) Owning a common economy with territorial mobility for the members. 
 
3.1.2 National Culture 
 
The word culture originates from the Latin word cultura which means 
“cultivating”.9 Culture, in this sense, is affiliated with cultivation and production; in 
agricultural terms it is the growth of crops, and in societal terms, it means the 
thriving of civilization in general and civilization of a certain society in particular. 
In agricultural processes, whatever a farmer sows to the field will come up later as 
the product, if sufficient care is given and the environment is suitable for it. In the 
                                                 
9
 According to the Etymology Dictionary, the term “Culture” is generated from Latin word cultura 
and, first appeared in 1404 with the attributed meaning of "the tilling of land". In 1510 , the word 
acquired meaning of "cultivation through education". Later on in 1805 the meaning transformed into 
“the intellectual side of civilization” and “collective customs and achievements of a people” in 1867. 
Source:  Online Etymology dictionary accessible at: http://www.etymonline.com/index.php  
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societal counterpart of the aforementioned process, whatever the society sows into 
the social life, will grow up as the product of this cultivation and flourish as the 
culture of that society; of course, with adequate effort of the society and with a 
suitable environment. 
 
“Cultures are made of various norms and identities that have different salience in 
different political domains”, writes Katzenstein (1996b:38) when he tries to 
describe the role of culture and norms in security policies (of Japan in the context 
of his book Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post-war 
Japan). However, culture is not limited to norms and identities; it also includes the 
history of the society, which brings in the legacies of that society’s past, as well as 
its values and its goals.  
 
To move from National Culture and Identity to National Security Culture and 
Identity, one needs to know that NSCI is not detached from the influence of 
national culture and national identity (contrary to the assumptions of realism, which 
would not recognize any difference due to domestic variations or local 
characteristics). In other words, “who you are” inescapably influences “what you 
see” as security; what you understand from security, how you provide it or how you 
react against threats jeopardizing it.  
 
American Culture and American Identity demonstrates differences from German, 
French (or European Identity, if we can speak of one) or Turkish National Identity, 
which inevitably leads to differences in terms of behavior (or in terms of Culture). 
How will the American government or Israeli government react to a possible 
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Iranian nuclear test in 2010? It is very difficult to give a precise and certain answer 
to this question, due to the complexity of the problem at hand, but one thing is 
certain: how the US or Israel will react to the issue would be clearly different than 
Europe’s behavior, if we establish our predictions based on their respective 
behavior towards Iran in its process of nuclearization with a relatively unclear end 
goal. Even though the US, France, Germany, Turkey, Russia or Iran share many 
similarities stemming from being a state in the international system, they differ in 
their security understanding as they have different NSCIs. Their divergent NSCIs 
prioritize different things or values.  Different NSCIs devalue dissimilar objects and 
through the glasses of their own NSCIs, nations might see a different world than 
what other nations are seeing.    
 
NSCIs, as the examples above try to explain, is the prism through which a nation 
characterizes its security understanding. For Identity/National Identity, the 
answer(s) to the question “Who are you?” provides the expected outcome and, as a 
recent study at Bilkent University demonstrates, people fill in the answer with 
many adjectives that in the end constitute the components of Identity/National 
Identity.10 For NSCI, the question changes and so does the answer or answers. The 
answer to the question “What (kind of) security actor are you?” describes a 
particular state’s NSCI. For this thesis, two types of security identity will be 
evaluated, which are Real-politic Security Identity and European Security Identity, 
portrayed as differing security understandings.     
 
                                                 
10
 Participant of the study used categories like; Turkish-ness, religious affiliation, the city they were 
born, ethnic background, job, gender, type of clothing, age level, to answer the question of who they 
were and to describe their identity. Eide, Karalyn. 2007. " Turkish Identity: National vs. State 
Identity in Turkey and Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations." Unpublished master's thesis. Ankara, 
Turkey: Bilkent University, Ankara. 
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3.1.3 Why NSCI is important? 
 
“The concept of linkage between culture, identity and national security policy exists 
in classic works, including the writings of Thucydides and Sun Tzu and Carl von 
Clausewitz” (Lantis, 2002). When it comes to NSCI, in the context of states and 
International Relations, scholars posits differing views. For Johnston (1995:46), 
strategic culture is “an ideational milieu which limits the behavioral choices…an 
integrated system of symbols which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting 
strategic preferences…”. Colin S. Gray, a realist thinker and strategic studies 
professor, in contrast, conceptualizes “culture as context”, which comprises and 
pervades behavior of political actors, thus going all the way down (Meyer, 2006:16).   
 
NSCI is important in understanding the security behavior of a particular state, 
because it is the national style of security (achieving/providing security or 
interpreting security) or strategy (Nye, 1988:14) of a particular state. NSCI is a 
critical factor in determining how a state behaves in terms of security (alliance 
formation versus non-alignment, European or real-politik behavior, defensive 
versus offensive real-politik etc..), what type of instruments it prefers to realize its 
goals (military use of force, economy and interdependence, diplomacy, bargaining 
and negotiation etc…), what ends it desires (maximum security for itself at the 
expense of others or regional cooperative security or integration and deepening 
institutionalization etc…) and how it defines the other side (rival, competitor, rival, 
adversary, enemy, partner, ally act..) 
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Contrary to the realist assumptions about state behavior being similar under similar 
conditions for the same situation, states differ in their security and strategic choices. 
Not all states decide to gain nuclear power and some states even denuclearize in a 
nuclearizing world. Some states voluntarily hand over some of their power in 
certain areas to international organizations, while others reinforce their absolute 
power and control over their population. Not all states look for alliances or not all 
of them look for the same type of alliances. These kinds of behavior deviations 
from expected patterns or dissimilarities with each other cannot be explained with 
the idea that all states are like units providing the same functions only in differing 
performance levels.  
 
The NSCI of a state influences its threat perceptions and instrument selections for 
security. Combined with the world environment (conjuncture) and regional 
dynamics, NSCI shapes the behavioral choices in foreign policy, alliance 
formations, security understanding and security-making. 
  
How NSCI influences a state’s security character and behavior can be exemplified 
by Japan, for which Katzenstein (1996b) provides insights. Japanese Security 
Culture and Identity generates “nonviolent state behavior in terms of security” 
(Katzensten, 1996). This fact is closely connected to the distinctive features of 
Japanese NSCI (which experienced important transformations during the course of 
near history; from imperial Japan invading continental Asia to pacifist trading state). 
Japanese NSCI has a significant impact on a wide variety of security related issues, 
from definition of the basic concepts, to interpretation of particular events and, 
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overall, to understand Japanese security behavior one needs to consider Japanese 
NSCI, in addition to systemic variables.  
 
3.1.4 NSCI and transformation 
 
NSCI, contrary to the assumptions of realism, and in line with the assumptions of 
Constructivism, is open to change, as a result of strong internal/external forces or 
motivators.  That is why, as Karaosmanoğlu (2000:200) states, “national security 
culture is not static; indeed it can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, 
coded and culturally translated. While National Security Culture is not static and is 
open to change, as Karasomanoğlu (2000) indicated, it is not elastic either. It does 
not change overnight with daily political events nor does it go with the flow of 
everyday domestic or international politics. The dynamism which opens the gate for 
change comes from the fact that Security Culture and Identity is a socially 
constructed element of the state and with the change in social interactions among 
the actors, this social construct: “National Security Culture and Identity” changes. 
 
However, the process of change in NSCI should not be expected to be an easy 
flowing or smoothly running one. States are the traditional and old-line actors of 
the system and traditional institutions are not so enthusiastic about change. They 
exhibit voluntary or involuntary resistance to change from time to time, depending 
on the context and the sources of this change. In addition, institutional and 
historical dimensions of state identity limit the dynamism of NSCI. The historical 
experiences and institutional structures of the particular state (types of domestic 
actors, institutions and power distribution among them, dominance of more 
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traditionalist groups or institutions like the role of the Turkish army in terms of 
security culture formation and change, etc.) provide a strong influence on NSCI and 
they act as the constants of this concept (continuity dimension). This answers the 
query of Katzenstein (1996a), who questioned the reasons for not seeing a constant 
change in norms and national identities (whether it be security or not).  In the 
Turkish context, this situation is called “Continuity and Change” 11 , which 
emphasizes the fact that some elements of the NSCI continues to prevail, while 
some do not, during the transformation of the NSCI.  
 
Depending on the direction or duration of the change, or an incompatibility 
between the existing and newly acquired culture and identity, or due to a major 
change in the system, the state might go through a process called “Identity Crisis”, 
which basically means that the state finds it very difficult to answer the question of 
what characterizes its security; what kind of security actor it is now. An Identity 
Crisis of a state might put the state in jeopardy, for the state will not be able to have 
a clear, well defined security culture. At the same time, according to Bilgin 
(2004:153), an “identity crisis is an opportunity for policy-makers to re-inscribe the 
state identity in line with changing perceptions of national interest.” 
 
One problem identified while dealing with NSCI in International Relations is that 
“social science has developed no exact methodology for identifying distinctive 
national cultures and styles” (Gray, 1988). For Lantis (2002), this is the reason why 
even the supporters of the idea that NSCI influences National Security Policy, are 
                                                 
11The conceptualization belongs to Oral Sander. Detailed information can be found: Sander, 
Oral. 1984. Turkish Foreign Policy; Forces of Continuity and of Change.” In Ahmet Evin, ed., 
Modern Turkey; Continuity and Change. Opladen: Leske Verlag. 
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careful in dealing with real affects of it.  The complexity of the concepts for this 
issue like; National Culture and Identity complicates and calculation for a precise 
calculation of effects, yet this does not constitute an irreparable damage and various 
studies on National Security Culture and Identity of various nations like Turkish, 
Greek or Japanese, made it clear that scholar working on the issue are developing 
better analytical framework for analysis (Katzenstein, 1996).   
 
 
How can the transformation in Security (Culture and Identity) be explained? 
 
 
“Marvel for a moment at the fecundity of the human imagination when it comes to 
inflicting violence on each other” says Buzan (1998) when he is discussing military 
power from early history to present. In fact, archeological evidence presented in the 
previous titles proves the assumption that “in the beginning there were just fists, 
feet and teeth, and simple sticks and stones” to do the job, however, as history 
progressed, the means that human groups have been using to harm each other kept 
changing, kept getting more and more sophisticated and better performing, which 
unfortunately meant less effort to exterminate greater numbers. The more deadly 
the weapons became; the more anxious humanity got, and looked for more ways to 
defend itself and harm the other. As the ways of threatening the other changed, 
inevitably the meaning of security (which basically means being free from the 
armed or non-armed threats of other party or parties) has changed. This has brought 
in the problematic of transformation in Security as a concept and Security 
Understanding in general.   
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There can be many reasons for transformation of security understanding (Identity 
and Culture). The accession to a body that has the power to motivate and realize 
such a change like EU, for instance, can be one of many. Türkmen (2001) argues 
that joining the EU would eventually transform Turkey’s strategic culture and this 
argument offers a relevant example. In another situation, the change might be 
triggered by a major structural change that causes a reshuffling of power 
instruments and a displacement in relative power distribution. The list might go on 
like this but this research will focus on the transformation of security understanding 
due to the exposure to another security environment and security understanding, to 
which the state under consideration is opting to be a part of.  
 
Security changes! It takes on different forms like food security, energy security or 
border security etc, and it takes place on various levels like individual/human 
security, national security or international security. No matter what, it is certain that 
Security, with its relevant branches and conceptual components, is not “unalterable, 
but neither is it transient” 
 
This thesis will provide two models explaining the transformation taking place in 
security and security identity of a state.  The first model is Katzenstein’s (1996a) 
model, which he devised to demonstrate the identity change (and a consequent 
interest and policy change) as a result of the interaction with the environmental 
structure. The second model is Rieker’s (1996) model of Europeanization of 
National Security Identity. Those two models, despite being independent ones, 
complete each other in forming a comprehensive explanatory model for identity-
based change and subsequent change in security policies. Following the 
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presentation of those two transformation models, another model will be presented 
to explain the change in the Turkish case.  
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3.2.1 Katzenstein Model of Transformation:12 
 
 
Figure 1: Katzenstein Model of transformation in Security 
 
* Environmental structure means cultural and institutional elements (of the source 
in this context)    
 
Briefly, this model tries to demonstrate the interaction patterns mainly between the 
identity of the state (security identity in the scope of this thesis) and the external 
source of transformation. Basically the environmental structure influences identity 
and, in turn, this influence and the change inflicted by this influence is reflected to 
interests and policy, respectively.  
 
                                                 
12
 This model labels broad categories of causal construction effects. It is thus not a total causal 
model of state security activity. Specifically, since some actor properties are intrinsic, “identity” is 
not the only cause of “interest.” The model under consideration here is not a singled-out theory on 
its own. Katzenstein, Peter (ed.) 1996a. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 
World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. 
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3.2.2 Rieker Model of Transformation (Europeanization of National Security 
Understanding): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Rieker Model of Transformation: Europeanization of National Security 
Culture and Identity 
 
Rieker’s European Security Assumptions (Rieker, 2006): 
 
a) The European Security context has changed radically since the end of the 
Cold war, giving the concept of security a different and broader meaning. 
 
b) The EU has developed a security identity in tune with this new security 
context. 
 
 
The EU’s Security Culture 
and Identity 
EUSCI 
 
National Security Culture 
and Identity 
Change 
Europeanization 
Process 
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c) This security identity influences national security identities of EU member 
states as well as other states closely linked to the integration process, 
through a process of Europeanization. (Relevance to Turkish case) 
 
While Rieker’s illustration of change provides the basics when it comes to 
European influence on National Security and the Europeanization of NSCI, still 
there is room in her model for improvement through inclusion of a detailed 
representation of the steps.  
 
The following illustration, which is a modified, localized and elaborated 
combination of Katzenstein and Rieker models and assumptions, tries to explain 
how the transformation in National Security Culture and Identity takes place.  
 
How has the substantive European Security Culture and Identity influenced and 
transformed (if it did or has been doing) Turkish National Security Culture and 
Identity? 
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Figure 3: Europeanization of National Security Culture and Identity: Turkish example 
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3.3 Indicators of Transformation:  
 
To see whether a transformation has taken place (or is taking place) in a state’s 
NSCI and behavior, one can look at various categories of action and pillars of 
decision making processes of the state. Comparison of former and latter behavior or 
situations will demonstrate the existence or inexistence of a transformation. In this 
sense, three categories; “Style and instruments of Security, Processes of Decision-
making, and Expected Outcomes” can be identified as relevant categorizations to 
evaluate the change. 
 
3.3.1 Change in terms of Style and Instruments of Security 
 
At the very basic, the change in the style means a modification in the way the state 
acts in a particular situation. It is the way that the state speaks out about its issues. 
The style of security is also defined by the instruments it prefers. In other words, it 
is a change in the way the state talks and walks when it comes to security. How the 
state reacts to different situation changes through a transformation in security 
understanding.  
 
A state might employ civilian-economic instruments to ensure security for itself or it 
might rely on military means. The type of power instruments a state relies on (hard 
vs. soft, military vs. non-military), the kind of political rhetoric a state employs (an 
aggressive one vs. a milder one), the level at which that state seeks to resolve the 
differences and handle affairs (unilateral vs. multilateral) and the way a state defines 
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the other parties (rival-competitor vs. enemy-adversary) give hints about the style 
and instruments of a state.   
 
3.3.2 Change in terms of Decision-Making Processes 
 
In the decision making process, various bodies and institutions of the state are 
involved and they each posses a relative weight in the overall process. Whether 
civilians or the military has the dominant position in the decision making process 
and mechanisms, is an important indicator about the nature of the decision making 
process. The state’s decision making mechanism becomes more and more 
civilianized and its civilian nature is reinforced through transformation.  
 
The classical difference between high politics and low politics gradually disappears. 
The issues of significance to the state become more and more interlinked with each 
other during the globalization process. With this change, the possibility of defining 
potential security problems as political problems increases. The civilian dimension 
not only includes stronger participation on the side of political parties and 
government and civilian bureaucrats, but also an empowered civil society. The 
change in terms of process replaces the “weakly institutionalized democracy and 
insufficient civil society” (Rumelili, 2004) and provides an autonomous space for 
civil society and vigorous participation of non-governmental groups in different 
forms, ranging from civilian inspection of decisions and expenses (transparency of 
Security affairs) to civilian contributions to decision making and common wisdom 
(with research, public debates and discussions etc…) 
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3.3.3 Change in terms of Expected Outcome 
 
The assumed transformation in a state’s security identity shows itself in the form of 
that state’s expected outcomes from any particular situation. In this sense, the 
transformation signals a “reorientation of the organizational logic [of] national 
politics and policy making” (Ladrech, 1994). This means that the state will follow 
the logic of appropriate action in its expected outcomes rather than a self-interested 
logic of consequences. This gradual change will unify the expectations of the 
particular state and the expectations of the higher institutional bodies that are 
participating. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DIFFERENT WORLDS, DIFFERENT MINDS:  
EUROPEAN SECURITY UNDERSTANDING vs. REAL-POLITIK 
SECURITY UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
 
In this part two different security understandings: “European Vs. Real-politik”, will 
be discussed and elaborated. They will be compared as different and competing 
security understandings. Before going further into the details of the two security 
cultures there are several points we need to keep in mind. 
 
First of all, these two different security cultures do not exist in isolation; on the 
contrary they sit at the opposite ends of a security continuum and this research, at its 
heart, has the intention to see if Turkey has moved from Real-politik end to 
European end.  
 
Secondly, both of the security understandings/cultures/models etc. are “ideal types” 
that are provided to IR scholars to evaluate the “Security Culture” at theoretical 
level. As Weber, the originator of the concept explains; the conduct of social science 
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depends upon the construction of hypothetical concepts in the abstract. “The "ideal 
type" is therefore a subjective element in social theory and research; one of many 
subjective elements which necessarily distinguish sociology from natural science” 
(Weber, 1904). In other words, researcher defines different concepts of the social 
world and creates “ideal types” to investigate. Ideal types are necessary to study 
different aspects of the social world however this does not mean that there will be 
one to one correspondence between the ideal type and practical world. Still this does 
not mean the concept is not relevant to the real world. In this sense, by 
operationalizing European Security Understanding and Real-politik Security 
Understanding, we create ideal types and this is important to keep in mind when 
trying to make comparisons between the research and practical world.  
 
Lastly, Europeanization, European Security Culture and Real-politik Security 
Culture are concepts that are widely discussed, debated and contested. Many 
scholars will come up with differing explanations for any of them. This thesis tries 
to benefit from many perspectives and studies done on the subject however it also 
tries to limit itself to its operational definitions provided in the respective chapters 
and evaluate Europeanization of Turkish Security Culture within the confines of the 
explanations provided.  
 
To explain what European Security Understanding comes to mean, this thesis will 
briefly survey European Security Culture and Identity (ESCI) and efforts towards a 
unified European Security policy.  
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4.1 European Security Understanding: ESCI at a glance 
 
What is Europe? What does European Security Understanding mean? There are 
many different answers for these questions and the debate over these terms has been 
going on for quite a long time.   
 
4.1.1 What is Europe? 
 
Europe is a geographical, political, cultural and historical entity with its roots in the 
past, influence on the present and power for the future. It can also “be seen as a 
combination of the nations within Europe plus the formation of an overarching 
civilization identity with the label “European” (Buzan, 1990). Europe covers an area 
more than 4 million km2 with more than 490 million people living within its area. 
The geographical and political dimensions of Europe do not have a one-to-one 
correspondence. Twenty-seven countries of the European continent have come 
together under the umbrella of the EU, some European countries are not members of 
this Union (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Serbia, San Marino, Vatican city state, 
Montenegro, Monaco, Moldova, Liechtenstein, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, 
Andorra, Albania) and some are still in the process of becoming a member (Turkey, 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Croatia)  
 
The EU, the supranational body that ties the 27 members and 3 candidates together, 
became what it is now in ten historic steps13, which are:  
 
                                                 
13
 Gateway to the European Union: Europe at a glance: Ten historic steps, 
http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_2/index_en.htm.   
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1) 1951: The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is established by 
the six founding members 
2) 1957: The Treaty of Rome establishes a common market  
3) 1973: The Community expands to nine member states and develops its 
common policies  
4) 1979: The first direct elections to the European Parliament  
5) 1981: The first Mediterranean enlargement  
6) 1993: Completion of the single market  
7) 1993: The Treaty of Maastricht establishes the European Union  
8) 1995: The EU expands to 15 members  
9) 2002: Euro notes and coins are introduced  
10) 2004: Ten more countries join the Union (Bulgaria and Romania followed 
on 1 January 2007) 
 
In its journey since 1951, the Union has passed though (and is still going through) 
important transformations. The evolution of the EU is formed by two main 
dimensions. The first is the Vertical Expansion, which means the deepening of 
integration among the already existing members and intensification of integration 
efforts. The second is the Horizontal Expansion, meaning the inclusion of new 
members to the Union. While the Vertical Expansion or deepening of integration 
meant improving the connections among the members that will hold them together, 
unify them around the common aspects, values and norms of the Union, and will 
contribute to the creation of a single European identity; the Horizontal Expansion 
meant including new members to this collective identity. While the Vertical 
Expansion dimension works to strengthen the internal cohesion of the Union and 
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improves its capacity to act as a single body, the Horizontal Expansion dimension 
refreshes the power of Europe’s attraction, and contributes to its soft power, as well 
as providing Europe with fresh resources on all fronts, from labor to material, from 
political power to border stability.   
 
Since the formation of the ECSC in 1951, to the EU of today, Europe aimed at 
combining European states around a European identity, European values and 
European norms. The main objectives of the EU, in this vein, can be expressed as 
such:14 
 
To promote economic and social progress (the single market was 
established in 1993; the single currency was launched in 1999); to 
assert the identity of the European Union on the international 
scene (through common foreign and security policy, common 
positions within international organizations, European 
humanitarian aid to non-EU countries and collective action in 
international crises); to introduce European citizenship (which 
does not replace national citizenship but complements it and 
confers a number of civil and political rights on European 
citizens); to develop an area of freedom, security, and justice 
(linked to the operation of the internal market and more 
particularly the freedom of movement of persons); to maintain and 
build on established EU law (all the legislation adopted by the 
European institutions, together with the founding treaties). 
 
 
Both Vertical and Horizontal dimensions of expansion contributed to the creation of 
a common European identity, in general, and ESCI, in particular. While widening of 
the borders with horizontal expansion brought in new ingredients for a European 
(Security) Culture and Identity, the deepening aspect reinforced the integration of 
new and old elements to form a common single ESCI, therefore, a common 
European security policy.  
 
                                                 
14
 Gateway to the European Union: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm  
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The signing of the Treaty of European Union (The Maastricht Treaty) in 1992 was 
an important step towards the formulation of a European Security Identity and 
subsequent Common Foreign and Security Policy. The treaty acknowledged three 
central pillars for the EU: 
1) European Community - Union citizenship, Community policies, Economic 
and Monetary Union, etc.  
2) Common foreign and security policy.  
3) Police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) stands as an important indicator 
for the EU to achieve a common Security Culture and Identity. Even though CFSP 
suffers various problems, ranging from financial issues to the nature of action (those 
problems can be seen as indicators of an evolving ESCI or European Security 
Identity (ESI). The EU is a dynamic organization with its 27 members and 3 
candidates. ESCI is produced and reproduced in relation to the membership 
dynamics of the Union. As long as the widening in the EU carries on, the influence 
of globalization is felt and changes in the nature and type of security threats 
continues, the ESCI will go through transformation as well. While the changes and 
the subsequent problems are indicators of the dynamic nature of ESCI, it still is an 
important development towards a settled ESCI and security policy.  
 
ESI appeared in Western European Union (WEU) official documents for the first time 
in 1992, when WEU released the Petersberg Declarations on 19 June (What ESI means 
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in the document corresponds to what ESCI means in this thesis).15 Following the WEU 
declaration, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, that paved the way for the development of 
an institutionalized security dimension for the EU, entered into force in November of 
1993. In the Maastricht Treaty, the notion of ESI is inscribed in the second pillar; the 
common security and foreign policy (enshrined in Title V of the Treaty on European 
Union/Maastricht) and ESI is seen as “the most recent brick in the construction of the 
concept of European identity” (Burgess, 2003). 
 
“Through the gradual crystallization of a CFSP that was born in the Maastricht 
Treaty of the EU, coupled with an irregular, but continuous, process of political, 
economic and cultural integration, the EU aspires to develop a consolidated security 
identity” (Burgess, 2003), a security identity that combines military and civilian 
aspects, that integrates the wide range of expectations of the members from Nordic 
states to new comers of the Southeast, that provides solutions to immediate existing 
problems, as well as the ones that the Union might come across in its journey to the 
22nd century.  
 
Even though Claude (1984:25) argues that “there is little sign in some areas of  
Europe that force is losing its utility or that European institutions are capable of 
providing an infallible formula for the solution of the problems posed by ethnic 
conflicts, border disputes, state fragmentation and national minorities,” (Claude, 
1984) formed on the columns of a community logic/appropriateness logic, the ESCI 
                                                 
15
 The term is used in a similar fashion to European Security culture. Basically, it means a commons 
style of European action or common European way of security. Western European Union Council of 
Ministers Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992 
. http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf 
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holds its value as an alternative outlook and as an important source of 
transformation through interaction and integration.  
 
4.1.2 European Security Understanding 
 
This thesis interprets the European Security Understanding (ESU) as a value-
oriented, norm-based security understanding that emphasizes the founding values of 
the EU when pursuing security and foreign policy goals. The ESU advises its 
subscribers to follow a security and foreign policy that prioritizes the advancement 
of definitive values of Europe. What a state with an ESU is expected to do is to refer 
to the founding values when it is going to make a security or foreign policy decision. 
This understanding demands that the governing orientation should not be national 
interest; rather it should be the values that bring the community together and holds 
them as one around the same table. The idea is not to promote competition or 
provoke a race for the sake of interest bound gains, but to promote certain values, 
starting from the circling environment and extending it to the distant areas.       
 
The ESU urges the states to seek “European ends” (advancement of values, norm 
compliance and promotion of influence through attraction) through “European 
means”. European means can be termed civilian-nonmilitary instruments. These 
instruments can be;  
 
A) Economic (sanctions, restrictions, loans, credit, aid, financial support for 
developmental projects, direct investment in the intended country, creation 
of interdependency, flow of goods and labor etc..),  
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B) Cultural (inclusion in cultural activities like year’s cultural capital, 
conducting mutual cultural activities like concerts, art exhibitions, respective 
“country of the year” activities like Turkish year in France etc…),  
C) Educational (student and scholar exchanges among universities and high 
schools, Comenius, Leonardo, Socrates, Grundtvig, Minerva, Lingua 
programs for different portions of the society, researcher mobility, 
standardization of educational procedures like European Language portfolio 
etc…) 
D) Political/Diplomatic (Encouraging certain ways of action, voicing benefits of 
norm compliance and promoting prestige of reduction in violent power like 
abolishing mine use and cleaning the already buried mines etc.. 
 
Many similar items can also be added to the list, yet the point is that a state with an 
ESU will seek European Security ends with European Security means. The 
combination of these two aspects (EUropean ends and EUropean means) constitutes 
a real and effective ESU and it provides solid evidence that the ESCI is at work here.  
 
4.2 Realpolitik Security Understanding 
 
Realpolitik. This word conjures up images of tough leaders and armed forces. The 
term has also come to imply a certain amorality or immorality, choosing the most 
effective course regardless of whether it is the right or proper one; in other words, 
without being overly concerned about its appropriateness as long as it serves the 
state’s interests (Wayman and Diehl, 1994). 
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In addition to “angst” (fear, anxiety), “blitzkrieg” (lightning war), and “schaden-
freude” (malicious-joy, malicious glee), Realpolitik is one of those German words 
that have come into English usage and entered into International Relations 
terminology. In spite of its familiarity, however, the origins and connotation of the 
phrase remain, to most people, including most historians, rather obscure (Sperber, 
2005). 
 
Linguistically the word means “political realism or politics of reality” in German 
and it was first used by a German journalist and politician named Ludwig von 
Rochau in 1853 in his work called Grundregeln von Realpolitik, angewendet an den 
politischen Zuständen von Deutschland (Realpolitik Principles Applied to the 
Political Conditions of Germany) and since then has found a broad sphere of usage.  
 
Across time and space, how it was used and what it meant changed, however, it 
generally revolved around similar conceptions and interpretations. A Turkish 
newspaper was explaining Realpolitik as “up-to-date, real/realist politics” (güncel, 
gerçek/çi politika) in an article about the Middle East (Kahraman, 2003). Even 
though this presents an over-simplification, it still holds a truth value. Basically 
Realpolitik means being pragmatic in policies pursued, following what is feasible 
and possible in each situation through reliance on military power and alliances. It 
means the rational calculation of the possible and the most beneficial ends for the 
state. 
 
While Realpolitik broadly means pragmatism, focusing on what is (instead of what 
ought to) and battling to acquire the best result for the state, Realpolitik Security 
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Understanding (RSU) moves from that similar point of departure. RSU, with its 
Realpolitik means and ends, focuses on national interest. Without being restrained 
by the appropriateness considerations, this understanding of security urges the states 
to seek self-interested gains. The main referential point for this understanding is 
“National Interest”.  
 
 
RSU claims that the purpose of foreign policy is to ensure the security of the state 
(raison d’etat), rather than crusading for values, norms or humanitarian purposes. 
The pragmatism of this understanding demands the states to act in the most efficient 
ways to realize maximum gain for themselves in a fragmented world, governed by 
an anarchic international system whose members are nothing but similar units in an 
endless fight for survival.  
 
A true RSU demands a motivation to realize Realpolitik ends through Realpolitik 
means. Realpolitik ends could vary from a direct annexation of a territory to 
promoting influence over a state or a community. The focal point here is the gain 
provided for the state. According to this understanding, the state aims to realize its 
power-oriented goals. Those goals are self-oriented objectives of the state and are 
expected to be achieved, sometimes at the expense of others. Any state following 
this understanding or logic, aims to provide security for itself by using hard power 
instruments, and by exercising power over others. Security, and a subsequent 
stability, is first demanded for self, and, once achieved, can then be expanded to 
others and to surrounding areas, if it is necessary for the security of that state. The 
primary intention to expand stability in the surrounding environment is to gain 
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security for self. It is not an action taken because of its merits all by itself but 
because of its utility value for the interest of the state.  
 
While ends are self-interested and self-oriented for RSU, the means are no exception. 
As long as state interest is served, any means is useable and any means is acceptable. 
RSU would mostly resort to military means to resolve its differences or to realize its 
ends. In the world of muscles, what will make the other listen to you is to have more 
muscle than your closest rival. This mindset encourages military investment and 
measures power in terms of military capability and power projection.  
 
A Realpolitik Security Culture and Identity would form the base of a RSU. In return, 
this will make a state an aggressive follower of interest through amoral or immoral 
means: Realpolitik ends achieved by Realpolitik means confirm the prevalence of a 
RSU. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
INDICATORS and REASONS of TRANSFORMATION IN TURKEY’S 
SECURITY CULTURE and IDENTITY 
 
 
 
This chapter will start with a discussion of the historical background of Turkish 
Security Culture and Identity. In this sense, the various periods of Turkish history 
that left their fingerprints on Turkish Security Culture and Identity (TSCI) will be 
dealt with, as well as various institutions. Following the historical aspects, indicators 
of a transformation that has been going on in TSCI will be elaborated and possible 
reasons for such a transformation will be explained. Finally, this thesis will discuss 
if the ongoing changes and shifts can be labeled as Europeanization and seek an 
answer to the Europeanization question of Turkish Security Culture: Do we really 
see a Europeanization in Turkish Security Culture? Or can the scholars interpret the 
differences and novelties they have been observing in TSCI, within the Realpolitik 
Security Culture?  
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5.1 Traditional Aspects of Turkish Security Culture 
 
5.1.1 Historical background 
 
Katzenstein (1996b) sheds light to the issue of the historical dimension and its 
influence on NSCI. He explains that “the Japanese security culture did not emerge 
mystically from the fog of ancient history, nor did it appear suddenly, magically, an 
immaculate historical conception in 1945” (Katzenstein, 1996). In a similar fashion, 
TSCI is not just the product of the Cold War or the Post-Cold War. While the 
Turkish Republic was born as a new state in 1923 with a new ideology and system, 
the new TSCI was still influenced by the Ottoman experience of Turks, which is 
called the “Ottoman legacy” of Turkey. Additionally, Sévres syndrome; a 
psychological-perceptive phenomena of the Turkish state, the single party era in 
Turkey, the great ideological confrontation and the following pole-less world left 
their traces on TSCI. All together they will be presented as the historical background 
of the current situation. To be able to see where TSCI is now and why, it is 
important to know where it comes from.  
 
5.1.1.1 Ottoman Legacy 
 
The Ottoman Empire, as Karaosmanoğlu (2000:201) explains, started with an 
offensive Realpolitik Security Culture. From its establishment in 1299, until its final 
halt in 1699 with Treaty of Karlowitz, Ottomans kept expanding in all directions, 
thanks to their religious motivations coupled with a hardheaded Realpolitik mindset. 
Raison d’ état or Staatsräson was a primary factor in Ottoman decision making. 
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Ottomans were careful in their strategic calculations so as not to find themselves in a 
war on two fronts at the same time. They relied on any instrument of RSU, at their 
disposal, from temporary alliances to strategic retreats, if needed. All in all, they 
were able to further the Ottoman Raison d’ état for a long time through an Offensive 
version of RSU. 
 
The dynamic nature of Security Culture was mentioned in the previous parts of this 
thesis. In line with this argument, Ottoman Security Culture underwent a 
transformation due to various reasons of the time (remaining backward in military 
technology, overstretched borders, new discoveries in the world, change in the 
power balance in Europe, pouring wealth to European states from distant colonies, 
etc…). “Its Security culture evolved from an offensive Realpolitik Security Culture 
to a defensive one” (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000:201) 
 
The less the Ottomans proved to be successful in protecting the territorial integrity 
of the empire, the more they became anxious about the future of the Devlet-i Ali 
Osman (the state of the Ottoman). While the Ottoman Empire was galloping 
towards its inevitable end, “How to protect or how to maintain the state” became the 
ultimate question for the bureaucratic elite. Those very same questions passed on to 
the Turkish Security Elite when the Turkish Republic was founded. From the very 
beginning, until now, the Turkish security elite have been concerned with those 
inherited questions. This continuity of mindset was a natural consequence of the 
continuity of the ruling elite from the old empire and the new state. The new 
republic inherited the Ottoman military and civilian elite, and along with them came 
the Ottoman defensive Realpolitik Security Culture and Identity. With this mindset, 
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everything revolved around the “State” and the state has always been under the 
traditional/inherited threats of the Ottoman era, as well as the new emerging threats 
as a result of the changing conjuncture in the world. Due to the Ottoman legacy in 
TSCI, it demonstrates typical features of Ottoman era security culture, like extreme 
caution in foreign policy, always looking for alliances, close relations with the West, 
etc… 
 
5.1.1.2 Sévres syndrome 
 
WWI ended on 11 November 1918, leaving millions dead and many more wounded. 
The victorious states gathered in Paris in 1919, and in the absence of the defeated 
side, they prepared peace treaties to be signed. The Treaty of Versailles with the 
German Empire, the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria, the Treaty of Neuilly 
with Bulgaria and the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary, were signed on different 
dates and officially ended the Great War for the signatories.  
 
The peace treaty with the Ottomans was the last and the latest one. It was signed in 
the small town of Sévres, located south of Paris, France on 10 August, 1920. The 
town of Sévres was famous for its porcelain and the Treaty of Sévres did not stand 
even as strong as the porcelain produced there (Marshal, 1924). It was not ratified 
by the Ottoman Parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan) and it was never adopted. Later on, 
as a result of the Turkish War of Independence, the Treaty of Sévres was superseded 
by the Treaty of Lausanne. 
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The name Sévres recalls the most tragic period of Ottoman history for Turkey. The 
Sévres Treaty was the official declaration of the end of the Ottoman era for many 
Turks of the time, and it represented the destruction of Ottoman land and the 
elimination of Ottoman rule. In this vein, the Sévres syndrome constitutes a general 
name for traditional Turkish fears (inherited from the Ottoman background) 
concerning the state, the nation and territory. The Ottoman legacy was haunting 
Turkish policy makers in their foreign and security policy decisions and it was 
affecting the decision making processes. In general, Sévres syndrome brought in a 
feeling of distrust for outsiders (Bilgin, 2002:1), a constant fear of abandonment by 
allies or supporting sides, a fear of encirclement by enemies and a fear of loss of 
territory like the Ottoman Empire had suffered in its last two hundred years. 
  
Sévres syndrome, and the fear of suffering the fate that the Ottoman Empire 
experienced, were important factors shaping TSCI, and, therefore, Turkish security 
behaviors and strategic choices.  
 
5.1.1.3 Republican Party Era 
 
In the Republican Party period, the memory of the decline and fall of the Ottoman 
Empire revived and it reinforced the concern for national unity as well as for law 
and order within the state borders (Heper, 2000).  
 
The prevalent security discourse in Turkey has been the discourse of the policy-
making elite since the early days of the Republic and there has been little public 
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questioning of or resistance to the security conceptualization of the security elite 
during the Republican period (Bilgin, 2002:7).  
 
With the inheritance of Ottoman defensiveness, combined with Ataturk’s non-
adventurism, the Republican Party era was a time of cautious engagement with the 
outside world. A web of treaties, agreements and pacts were formed to create a 
safety ring around Turkish land so that the new republic could flourish and prosper 
politically and economically. Atatürk’s famous quote “Peace at home, peace in the 
world (Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh) clearly characterizes the Security mindset of the 
Republican era in particular.  
 
5.1.1.4 Cold War Period 
 
Emphasizing Turkey’s geopolitical importance served as the most prominent 
component of Turkish security discourse during the Cold War period. Turkey; stuck 
between the two rival worlds, found itself a part of the Western camp. Western bloc 
was both a preference based on specific historical reasons and a dictation of the 
particular necessities for Turkey. Criss (2002) explains the historical aspect as the 
“long standing ambition of Turkey to integration with the West” and the particular 
necessities as “securing financial and military aid from the US and the Soviet 
threat”.16  
 
Over the course of its history “Turkey has historically displayed a relatively 
consistent security culture of realpolitik which has evolved across the centuries from 
                                                 
16
 For more detail on this see Criss, Nur Bilge. 2002. “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Dış Politikaları,” 
Doğu Batı, 6(21): 41-158. 
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a dominant offensive character into a dominant defensive one” (Karaosmanoglu, 
2000; 200). During Cold War years this defensive realpolitik security culture was 
strongly reinforced by the ongoing ideological and military confrontation between 
the Communist and western blocs. As Karaosmanoğlu (2000) explains that 
centuries-long Ottoman retreat from its powerful position pushed the Ottoman state 
into a position where “its military and diplomatic isolation subjected it to bargaining 
between the great powers over its territory”. When Turkey was founded in 1923, it 
not only inherited the Ottoman bureaucracy but also took over this diplomatic and 
military isolation as well. In the early years, there were various attempts to break 
free of the inherited isolation however, the effect of those alliances and treaties were 
limited in terms of integration with the West and the outbreak of the WWII radically 
changed the parameters. Therefore joining the NATO was the key for Turkey to 
break this vicious cycle and reinforce its position within the Western states, as well 
as its position vis-à-vis Soviet Union. 
 
From 1950’s to 1990’s Cold War dictated a strict national security mentality and 
state policies were shaped accordingly. Turkey participated in overseas war in an 
attempt to prove itself useful for the Western world and following its membership to 
NATO, military relations as well as diplomatic relations deepened with the West, 
but especially with the US. The high tension between the blocs, especially during 
50’s and 60’s, over emphasize of military security and preparation for a possible 
World War Three only worked to reinforce the realpolitik mind-set of Turkish 
security elite.  
 
With the turn of the 60’s Turkey experienced its first military coup and from 70’s on 
it became more and more occupied with domestic terrorism, unstable political 
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structure, coalition governments and economic hardships (Criss 2002). 1974 Cyprus 
Peace operation came in the middle of this chaos and it only stiffened the Turkish-
Western relations. Yet again in the 80’s Turkish political system suffered another 
military intervention and while Turkey was trying to normalize its domestic affairs 
and political structure, it suffered the outbreak of separatist terrorism. Domestic 
agenda occupied the Turkish policy makers and when Gorbachev announced the 
dissolution of Soviet Union, Turkey was neither ready for the immediate effects not 
for the long term changes.  
 
5.1.1.5 Post Cold War Period 
 
 
“Turkey’s international role and posture have been profoundly affected by the end 
of the Cold War. “For almost half a century, the constancy of the Soviet threat 
produced a constancy of American policy. Other countries could rely on the United 
States for protection because protecting them seemed to serve American security 
interests” (Waltz, 2000). The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union forced Turkey to redefine and reshape its foreign policy in important 
ways” (Larrabee, 2000). The new dynamics unleashed by the end of the Cold War 
have not only expanded Turkey’s foreign policy horizons, but have also led to an 
important shift in Turkish security perceptions; with which Turkish Security Culture 
has been shaped and reshaped (Larrabee, 2000).  
 
Immediately after the end of the Cold War years Turkey found itself in an 
environment with new opportunities as well as new challenges. Early 90’s witnessed 
new foreign policy attempts of Turgut Ozal and Süleyman Demirel. Especially 
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President Özal was envisioning a more active, more articulate and maybe even more 
aggressive foreign policy (Torumtay, 1996). However economic insufficiencies 
(Turkish economic capabilities were not in line with the promises made by the 
politicians neither in line with the expectations of the recipients- The newly 
independent states) as well as the resistance of the military crippled the initial 
attempts of a more active foreign policy (Kösebalaban 2002). 
  
In domestic sphere, Kurdish Workers Party’s (PKK) violence prevailed from 1984 
till 1999, when Abdullah Öcalan, the founder and person in charge of the 
organization was captured my Turkish intelligence units. When Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) came to power in 2002, it started off with a relatively 
stable security situation (due to inactivity of PKK side) as well as a recovering 
economy from the major banking crisis it suffered in early 2000.  
 
Due to a variety of reasons – some are particularly JDP related, some are relevant 
regardless of the ruling party- JDP undertook a major reformation in Turkish state 
system and a harmonization with European Institutions. European Union 
membership project was not something new for Turkey when JDP came to power. 
The European integration that took place after World War II strengthened European 
states in many ways. As Aybet (1999)  notes, “Not only the parameters of European 
security but also those of European culture were being redefined, as the division of 
Europe ceased to exist and Europe -east and west- was finding new grounds for 
bonding in historical, cultural, and religious terms” (Aybet, 1999). In line with the 
previous governments, JDP strived for EU membership and in a few years it was 
able to get membership status for Turkey.  
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With JDP in power, important steps have been taken in terms of Europeanization of 
legislation and policies. JDP, with its radically different foreign policy approach, 
challenged the traditional outlook on relations with the neighbors as well as former 
adversaries. While traditional security perspective of the security elites perceives 
neighbors less of a partner and more of a source of problem, Davutoğlu driven JDP 
foreign policy aimed at “Zero-problems-with-neighbors”.17 
 
In the final analysis, after the initials years of post-Cold War era during which 
Turkey found itself in a dilemma whether to embrace a more active involvement in 
international affairs or pursuing the tradition abstention politics (which is no longer 
as sustainable as it was during Cold War). With the turn of the new millennium a 
new party came to power and this brought significant changes with it. JDP’s ‘zero-
problem with neighbors’ approach, motivation to ensure economic integration of 
Turkey’s immediate surroundings, seeking mediation in perennial territorial disputes  
of its zones of interests stand out as significant factors that influenced Turkish 
Security Culture in post-Cold War era. (Davutoğlu, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 For more information on Davutoğlu’s perspective on Turkish foreign policy see: Davutoğlu, 
Ahmet. 2001. Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslar arası Konumu (Strategic Depth: The 
International position of Turkey). İstanbul: Küre. 
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5.2 European Transformation (Europeanization) in Turkish Security Culture  
 
5.2.1 Describing European Transformation in Turkish Security Culture: 
Indicators of Transformation: 
 
This thesis claims that when one looks at the available literature and the current 
developments, one can find several indicators pointing out to a European 
transformation in Turkish Security Culture however; one needs to be careful when it 
comes to interpreting the depth of this transformation and its overall impact on 
Turkish Security Culture. It is not surprising to see many scholarly work done on 
Europeanization of various aspects of Turkish state system and many of those 
studies raise important questions and bring in important contributions to the 
discussions yet when we look at the Europeanization issue from a combination of 
both means and ends (reaching European ends with European means), we might see 
a different picture. In the following parts various indicators of European 
transformation in Turkish Security Identity will be discussed and possible factors 
motivating this transformation will be presented. 
 
5.2.1.1 Europeanization of Turkish Security Culture in terms of style: 
 
In the theoretical discussion of the “style transformation”, it is mentioned that the 
change in the style means a modification in the way the state acts in a particular 
situation. It is the way that the state speaks out about its security issues. The style of 
security is also defined by the instruments it prefers. How the state reacts to 
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different situations changes over time only through a transformation in security 
understanding.  
 
When we look at the way Turkish policy making elite execute foreign and security 
policies, especially during the last decade we see important changes compared to 
previous decades. The way Turkey describes its security situation and its geography 
has significantly changed. The dominant rhetoric (which was being fed by the 
security culture and was reinforcing it in return) used to describe Turkey as an island 
surrounded by a sea of enemies18. Abandonment and encirclement nightmares of the 
Sévres syndrome were kept alive by this rhetoric. “Turks has no friends but Turks”19 
demonstrates the typical worldview of the traditional security culture of Turkey. 
However this bitter language of enmity, exclusion and constant fear of hostility 
started to alter especially in the last decade. Turkey started employ a more inclusive 
language and official rhetoric abandoned the perspective of viewing Turkey as an 
island surrounded by enemies, rather it started to portray a Turkey image where 
Turkey assumes a central role and creates a zone of influence cemented by 
economic integration, social relations and cultural ties (or in other words revives its 
historical zone of influence as Davutoğlu puts it) (Davutoğlu, 2001).   
 
The Europeanization in terms of style not only shows itself in the way Turkish 
policy making elite talks about issues and actors but also the way they approach 
those issues and those actors. Ankara has begun to see foreign and security policy as 
                                                 
18
 An important example for this type of thinking was clearly demonstrated in the remarks of a retired 
Turkish general, Armağan Kuloğlu when he spoke to a Turkish TV channel (NTV). He claimed that 
the more neighbors you have means the more problems you have, and in our case we can never have 
zero-problems with our neighbors while they have their eyes on Turkish territorial integrity. NTV 
live broadcasting, August 27, 2010.  
19
 Türkün Türk’ten başka dostu yoktur! 
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a distinctive policy realm in which pursuing competitive relations with other actors 
should no longer justify unchangeable self-other categorizations between Ankara 
and other capitals (Tiryaki, 2008).  The ‘zero problems with neighbors’ approach of 
the current JDP government appears to reflect this understanding. Instead of further 
alienating neighbors, Turkey has decided to face its problems with its neighbors and 
when dealing with those problems non-military instruments were emphasized. In 
this sense, Syria comes forward as an outstanding example.  
 
When we look at the Syrian-Turkish relations we witness an incredible 
transformation within a few years. While only less than 100 thousand people 
crossed the Syrian Turkish border in 1998 this number has risen to 509.679 people 
in 2009 which is expected to go even higher with the changes in the visa regime 
between Turkey and Syria.20 While Turkey was doing military drills near Syrian 
border as a warning to Syria due to their attitude toward PKK when we come to 
2009 Turkish and Syrian land forces began to plan joint military drills.21 This is a 
radical change over a relatively short time period and it clearly indicates that some 
things are changing in Turkish security mind set however critical question is 
whether this transformation in attitude and instruments signal a deep underlying 
differentiation in Turkish security culture or it is only Turkish security elite 
discovering new policy instruments? Is Turkey employing European means to 
achieve European ends? 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Euractive: 2009'da 27 milyon turist geldi, Almanlar başı çekti, 31.01.2010 
 http://www.euractiv.com.tr/turizm/article/2009da-27-milyon-turist-geldi-almanlar-basi-cekti-008730  
21
 TRT Haber: Suriye ile Ortak Tatbikat, 27.04.2009 
http://www.trt.net.tr/Haber/HaberDetay.aspx?HaberKodu=9b4d6d2d-e70e-45ac-b054-b13063af5a15  
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5.2.1.2 Europeanization of Turkish Security Culture in terms of process: 
 
When explaining transformation in terms of process this thesis mentioned that the 
process dimension involves various bodies and institutions of the state whose level 
of involvement in security matters is greatly influenced by the Security Culture of 
that state. With a European transformation we would expect to see a reshuffling of 
the relative weight each agent possesses in the overall process.  
 
Realpolitik Security Culture of Turkey emphasizes the military prominence and it 
overwhelmingly increases military’s role and power in this process. Infested with 
unabated national security threats, Realpolitik security culture in Turkey dictates 
military oriented process and military solutions to problems. Army is seen as the 
main actor and General Staff has the leading position (Kösebalaban 2002:135).   
 
In line with the Europeanization process, we would expect to see a more civilian 
security policy making formulated and supervised and audited by civilians. 
Recalling the European Security Culture/mindset discussion earlier, a 
Europeanization would mean that not only civilians are in charge of the process but 
also civilian and multilateral mechanisms are employed. 
  
When we look at the Turkish case we see significant changes such as the 
reformations concerning National Security Council. The institutional reforms in the 
National Security Council (NSC) caused a reshuffling of power in the process of 
foreign and security policy making. The seventh reform package which was passed 
on 23 July 2003 curtailed the military representation in the NSC and empowered the 
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civilian side. Foreign and security policy issues are now being discussed in the 
public and media to the extent one would have found it unbelievable ten years ago 
(particularly in Turkey’s relations with the EU, Cyprus, northern Iraq, Russia and 
Armenia) (Makovsky and Sayarı, 2000).22 The process of framing potential security 
issues as political issues is also becoming more evident (northern Iraq, Cyprus and 
Armenia are the leading examples) (Çelik and Rumelili, 2006). Through reform 
packages passed by respective JDP governments the process dimension of security 
policy has undergone important changes yet again the question remains still: Do all 
these changes imply a deep long-standing transformation in Turkish Security 
Culture?  
 
Reform packages that were passed to ensure harmonization with EU policies and 
bodies undeniably contributed to increase civilian power in the decision making 
process however it is not easy to say that from now on Turkish policy making elite 
is pursuing European goals with the newly civilianized mechanisms. With 
Realpolitik security culture; realpolitik ends were pursued with mostly realpolitik 
means. Non-civilian bodies had more role and say in the process of this pursuit. 
With the ongoing transformation, now civilians are pursuing realpolitik ends with 
more civilian mechanisms like diplomacy, economic ties, integration, creation or 
expansion of international-multilateral bodies etc. 
                                                 
22
 In “Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy”, the book edited by Alan 
Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, this situation is put forward as such: “Much of Turkish foreign-policy 
decision-making is shrouded in secrecy. Still, it can be safely said that the emergence of a stronger 
presidency and National Security Council over the last two decades of the twentieth century has 
increased the number of poles in Turkey’s "multi-polar" decision-making apparatus. The primary 
reference points now seem to be the presidency, prime ministry, and military, with the foreign 
ministry nevertheless still an important player. Which takes the lead in a crisis seems to be a matter 
of personality, political circumstance, and the issue at hand”. Little role used to be attributed to public 
and think tanks. However with the EU process foreign and security policy became issues of public 
and open debate. Once the multi-polarity in Foreign policy decision making meant involvement of 
Presidency, Prime minister, Ministry of foreign affairs and military in the process. However, now the 
process inevitably includes public, media and think tanks and business associations and so forth.   
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5.2.1.3 Europeanization of Turkish Security Culture in terms of expected 
outcomes: 
 
 “A reorientation of the organizational logic [of] national politics and policy 
making” (Ladrech 1994) will be the result of European transformation in security 
culture and this logic shift (from logic of consequences to logic of appropriateness) 
will alter the outcomes expected to be produces through security policies. For 
Realpolitik Security Culture expected outcomes would come in the form of more 
power, more security, more influence etc. for the state. Actions of a state informed 
by Realpolitik Security Culture will be self-interested and will be more pre-occupied 
with its own gains and its own problems. Any action taken under the influence of 
this type of security culture will have state interest in mind and the states priority is 
to maximize its gain or minimize its losses not expanding value systems for the sake 
of normative values of those systems.  
 
Under the influence of Realpolitik Security Culture, Turkey prioritized its national 
security over other issues. Increasing military power to ensure territorial integrity as 
well as non-interference of neighbors or powerful states, prioritizing Turkey’s 
military importance and geo-political significance, seeking close military ties with 
the West were all part of this logic and were all products of Realpolitik security 
understanding.  
 
Turkey defined its problems mostly as security problems and sought military 
solutions to those problems, such as Kurdish issue, disputes with Syria over territory 
and water rights, air and sea related problems with Greece. In all those cases, 
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Turkey formulated its relations through the lenses of Realpolitik Security Culture 
and perceived those issues as security problems/threats and sought realpolitik results. 
Expected outcomes were more power or influence for Turkey as it is seen s the only 
way to survive in the unstable conflict prone conflict triangle: Balkans-Caucasus 
and middles East. The volatile nature of the region pushed Turkey for more and 
more military preparation (in 1989 Turkey made 11,4 billion dollars-3.1 % of its 
GDP- military spending and this number rose up to 22,483 billion – 4 % o its GDP 
in 1999. The actual amount of spending doubled within a decade contrary to the 
expectations of many scholars who were predicting sharp declines in states military 
expenditures).23 On the other hand according to SIPRI data on Turkey, the military 
spending states that the spending has declined both in terms of actual amount of 
money spent and in terms of its proportion to GDP especially during the last decade. 
Inevitably the long cease fire of PKK is partly responsible for this situation yet 
deconstruction and politicization of Turkish security problems have its role as well. 
With the influence of Europeanization and as a result of more and more civilian 
involvement and public attention to security matters, Turkey started to switch to 
more non-military instruments to pursue its objectives  (Schrank, 2009).    
 
This thesis formulated European Security Culture as pursuing European ends 
(expected outcomes) with European means and without satisfying both tenets and 
especially the “ends” one cannot confidently claim that a true Europeanization has 
taken place. When we look at the Turkish case, we see a strong and motivated turn 
to European means yet when we look deep into the motivations we do not see the 
primary policy makers (which could include a variety of groups from presidency to 
                                                 
23
 Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database - Military expenditure of Turkey. Data is 
available at http://www.sipri.org/databases and data on Turkey covers the period from 1988 to 2009. 
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foreign ministry etc.) voicing claims from transforming the region or spreading 
European values or providing political integration of the region based on universal 
values. Rather we see Turkish policy makers as well as politicians emphasizing non-
military instruments to turn the surroundings of Turkey into a zone of peace and a 
zone of influence and in doing do increasing Turkish security and welfare (Laçiner, 
2009). Therefore the expected outcomes are still security oriented yet Turkish 
security elite has discovered the benefits of new instruments such as Football 
diplomacy with Armenia, tourism and cultural exchange with Syria, reaching out to 
non-Turkoman elements of Iraq, toning down the official language regarding the 
territorial waters issue with Greece, bringing the Caucasian states around the same 
table with multilateral organizations and confidence building between Iran and the 
West. 
 
5.2.2 Explaining the European Transformation in Turkish Security Culture: 
What motivates the transformation? 
 
5.2.2.1 Dynamics of EU Accession Process  
 
“It is not the symbolic geography that creates politics, but rather the reverse… 
Europe ends where politicians want it to end” (Todorova, 1997). While Todorova 
was talking about Balkans, she clearly reflected how Turks see their relationship 
Europe. Ottomans, as the descend from their powerful position from 17th century 
and on, tried hard to became part of the European state system (Karaosmanoğlu. 
2000;204). Turkish Republic, along with many other aspects, inherited this long 
term goal and when Europe started to get reorganized politically after WWII, 
Turkey wanted to be a part of this process as well.  
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The Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), was 
signed in Rome on 25 March 1957 by six countries (Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany), and entered into force on 1 
January 1958.24 Shortly after the founding treaty became effective Turkey applied 
for associate membership of the EEC and its application got a positive response in 
1963 and so began the Turkish journey to what eventually became European Union. 
 
Over the last 40 years Turkey has been trying to achieve full membership status and 
in this almost 5 decades long process it passed several important mile stones such 
as; full membership application in 1987, Customs Union (CU) negotiations in 1993 
and CU agreement in 1996, achieving candidate country for EU membership status 
in 1999, initiation of membership talks in 2004 and starting accession negotiations 
in 2005.25  Since 2005 several chapters of EU Acquis Communautaire have been 
opened for negotiations and closed and in the mean time Turkey passes 8 reform 
(harmonization) packages with 53 different laws and 218 articles were amended.26 
Inevitably the accession process, the attempts to harmonize Turkish laws with EU 
Acquis Communautaire and reforming the major legal and political bodies such as 
National Security Council or State Security Court pushed Turkey closer to a 
European foreign and security mindset; or at least these developments stemming 
from the EU accession process dynamics created leverage for politicians, 
specifically JDP, to divert the state security policies to a more liberal modus operand.  
 
                                                 
24
 Europe Treaties and Law: http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm  
25
 Information compiled from Turkish ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ab-
iliskileri.tr.mfa) and European Union (http://europa.eu/index_en.htm) official websites. 
26
 Turkey-EU relations: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ab-iliskileri.tr.mfa  
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Respective attempts to fulfill candidacy responsibilities and satisfy EU demands on 
the way to membership can be presented as one of the major motivators of the 
Europeanization in Turkey Security Culture as well as Turkey-specific reason for 
this transformation which will be explained under “domestic politics” title.   
 
 5.2.2.2 Domestic Politics: Justice and Development Party factor 
 
Established shortly before 9/11 attacks, JDP had the chance to present itself as the 
best alternative model for Islamic world (Gül, 2004: 3). In this sense, JDP’s rise to 
power was welcomed by Western Capitals, especially Washington, as 9/11 made it 
clear that Islamic world will occupy western agenda for a long time to come and in 
this process a moderate Islamic administration which has Islamic roots and rhetoric 
yet pursues pro-western policies and reconciliates Islamic and western values would 
be very helpful for the cause. A functioning Muslim democracy that is also pursuing 
economic and political integration with EU would be a valuable instrument in 
winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim communities elsewhere and it would 
weaken the radical tendencies by presenting a functioning moderate pro-western 
Islamic democracy model.  
 
Even though the JDP does not define itself as ‘Muslim democrat’ or ‘political 
Islamist’, many of its critics argue that it represents the continuation of political 
Islam under a new guise. Therefore, the Party tends to define itself either as a “post-
Islamist party” or a conservative democratic party (Ayoob, 2004:5).  
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The JDP-ruled Turkey did not hesitate to participated in the US led the Broader 
Middle East and North African Initiative as a democracy partner on the one hand 
and the UN-led Alliances of Civilization Initiative on the other (Çetinsaya 2008). 
Adopting a pro-EU oriented foreign policy might have been thought of bolstering 
the JDP’s post-Islamist institutional identity. From the very first days of its 
establishment JDP made it clear that it will pursue strong pro-EU policies.27 We can 
list a number of different reasons for JDP’s strong motivation to pursue pro-EU 
policies and its sense of ownership of this process however two factors stand out as 
stronger causes: Legitimacy concerns especially in domestic sphere and curbing the 
power of bureaucracy at home (military, judiciary etc.) 
 
Even thought JDP came to power with a significantly high percentage of votes in 
200228, due to the Islamic background of its founders (even though there were MPs 
with right wing background, the party as overwhelmingly made of politicians with 
political Islamist history and Milli görüş –National View- tradition.) the party was 
perceived as a threat to secular nature of Turkish state. In order to dispel the fears of 
Turkey’s secular elites that the JDP has not signed onto Turkey’s centuries-long 
westernization process and the secular state identity, pro-European policy 
orientation and Europeanization was the key. After all it would be difficult to argue 
and find domestic and foreign support that the JDP’s real goal is to transform 
Turkey into an Islamic society when the pace of Turkey’s Europeanization reforms 
increased?  The best way to prove that JDP believed in modernity, secularism and 
westernization would be moving Turkey closer and closer to Europe through 
Europeanization.    
                                                 
27
 JDP Political Program: http://www.akparti.org.tr/vi-dis-politika-_79.html?pID=50  
28
 Turkish High Electoral Commission Official website, 2002 General Elections results: 
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2002MilletvekiliSecimi/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahilgrafik.pdf  
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In addition to JDP’s desire to dispel legitimacy issues and disprove fears of an 
Islamic transformation, Europeanization was instrumental for the Party to curtail the 
influence of appointed bureaucrats in politics, most notably the Turkish army. 
Further democratization and liberalization alongside the EU accession process 
would in the end strengthen the civilization process at home. When the goal was 
defined to curtail the power of the army and judicial bureaucracy, the EU-led 
reformation process would help a lot (Ayoob, 2007). Many significant changes 
including the changes in the nature and structure of NSC can be interpreted in this 
vein. The more civilianized the Turkish state system and policy making, the stronger 
the Party will be vis-à-vis the Army and other appointed bureaucracy. One can also 
claim that this motivation for Europeanization partially explains the slow-down in 
the accession process, reformations and Europeanization, as the Party is now strong 
enough to fend off the bureaucracy without making reference of EU process.   
 
5.2.2.3 Relations with the US: Soft balancing a Hard Power 
 
When we look at official statements on Turkish American relations we see 
overwhelming emphasize on the deep roots of partnership, mutual significance and a 
comprehensive cooperation on many fronts: 
 
“Turkey is a vital strategic partner and NATO ally and occupies a 
strategic location between Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and 
the former Soviet Union. Turkey has been a critical ally in the 
global war on terrorism, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. 
Turkey’s policies and actions affect the resolution of a host of 
simmering regional conflicts, including Iraq, the Middle East, 
Cyprus, the Caucasus, and the Balkans”.29  
                                                 
29
 The US State Department Official Website: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/tu/   
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(The US State Department, country 
background information section) 
 
 
“Turkey and United States of America share a sound and deep-
rooted partnership. They stand together in the face of many 
international issues and challenges of the day such as the fight 
against terrorism, illicit trafficking of drugs-weapons 
humans, poverty, religious extremism. They share the same values 
and ideals such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, free 
market economy…Turkey and the U.S. have been closely 
cooperating in a wide geography stretching from the Balkans to 
the Caucasus, from the Middle East to Central Asia.”30 
(Turkish MFA Turkish-U.S. Political 
Relations Section) 
 
It is true that the US has a significant place in Turkish Foreign and Security policies 
and as reiterated by both sides US-Turkish cooperation has its roots going back to 
early 19th century. Even thought intense economic and political relations as well as 
security alliance started only after the Second World War, the origins of Turkish-
American relations and initial contacts go back to 1830 when The USS George 
Washington visited Istanbul and a trade agreement was signed.31  
 
From 1830’s to 1940’s Turkey had limited contact with the US and Washington 
had little impact on Turkish Security mindset. This has changed significantly with 
the end of WWII and military and political partnership with the US elevated to a 
high priority level for Turkey. Cold War and Soviet threat from the East brought 
Turkey closer to the US and since then close ties to the United States have been 
important for Turkey no matter which party or parties were in charge. “During the 
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 Turkish ministry of Foreign Affairs Official Website Turkish-U.S. Political Relations Section: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-u_s_-political-relations.en.mfa  
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 Council of American Ambassadors, Fall 2007, “United States and Turkey: Common Purposes in a 
Critical Region” The Ambassadorial Review. 
 http://www.americanambassadors.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.article&articleid=119  
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Cold War, the United States was seen as the main guarantor of Turkish security 
(Larrabee, 2000: 26).” Turkish policy makers focused on Soviet threat and relied on 
the US military protection and US actions in Europe and in the Middle East did not 
bother Turkey. However, the focus of the U.S.-Turkish relationship has shifted 
since the end of the Cold War; from Soviet Union to cooperation the Middle East, 
the Caspian region, and the Balkans and expanded from military cooperation to a 
number of areas other fields including energy, terrorism, religious extremism 
human trafficking etc (Larrabee, 2000;27). 
 
Despite the intense military and political relations and constant expression of mutual 
significance on both sides, Turkish-U.S. relations, have been far from trouble free. 
Starting with the Cyprus issue and the following US embargo, Turkish-American 
relations went through times of trouble and the invasion of Iraq consisted of the last 
chapter when we came to early 2000’s. The rejection of the temporary deployment of 
62000 US troops in Turkish soil by the parliament on 1 March 2003 in the invasion 
of Iraq, changed Turkish-American relations directions and surprised many 
Europeans, Americans and as well as Turks themselves (Emerson and Tocci, 2004). 
Following the rejection of the motion, tension between Ankara and Washington rose 
as the US administration strongly warned Turkey not to intervene in Northern Iraq 
independently of American command (Emerson and Tocci, 2004) and when the US 
troops arrested 11 soldiers from Turkish Special forces in July 2003 in 
Suleymaniye/Northern Iraq it only worked to worsen the already tense relations.  
 
“The Euro-American tension that developed during the Bush administration, 
particularly in regard to Iraq, has meant that it is no longer possible to talk about 
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“pro-Western” policies without distinguishing which “West” one is talking about” 
(Danforth, 2008:85). While the War in Iraq dealt a severe blow to the moral 
authority the US once enjoyed, Turkey started to diversify its foreign relations to 
open more space to other capitals including but not limited to Moscow and Tehran. 
The American image has suffered most in the Muslim world, which makes it 
especially difficult for any Turkish government trying to manage its relations with 
America and the Middle East (Danforth, 2008:87). Expectedly, Turkish public 
opinion was not immune to circulating negative sentiment toward the US. 
“According to the PEW Global Attitudes Survey, the number of Turks who had a 
favorable view of Americans fell from 32 percent in 2004 to 23 percent in 2005 and 
a mere 17 percent in 2006” (Grigoriadis, 2006:18). 
 
American actions and rhetoric after 9/11 made it clear for the rest of the world that 
the US, when it sees necessary, will use disproportionate measures to ensure it gets 
what it wants and the Bush administration was determined to take radical steps in 
the Middle East starting from Iraq.32 Turkey had specific fears and concerns related 
to its location as a bordering country to Iraq in particular and the Middle East in 
general (Emerson and Tocci, 2004). Turkey feared the political and economic de-
stabilization of the whole region starting from Iraq and the public grew an 
increasing mistrust to American goals in Iraq. Fearing a partition in Iraq and 
creation of an independent Kurdish state in the North, Turkey became more and 
more anxious about the American policies and balancing American power in the 
middles east became ever more important.  
 
                                                 
32
 See National Security Strategy of the United States of America-2002: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/  
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In the middle of all these growing tensions and changing calculations, Turkey 
found itself closer to Europe. The developments in the Middles East, especially 
after 2003, indicated that Turkish views were more in line with the EU capitals. 
Ironically, the US was one of the strong supporters of Turkey in its bid to EU 
membership and after 2003 it started to back-fire.  
 
5.2.2.4 Ever Increasing threats in/from Middle East 
 
Middle East has never been an easy geography to dwell in and it provides us a text-
book example of a Hobbesian type of world. From the early years of the republic 
and on, Turkey tried to refrain from Middle Eastern affairs and it stood away from 
the murky Middle Easter politics. This policy of limited engagement was more or 
less sustainable during the Republican Party are as well as Cold War.  
 
However developments after the end of Cold War made it apparent that no longer 
was it possible to stay away and stay intact. Even when Turkey decided not to take 
part in the events taking place in the Middle East, being a neighbor, it was deeply 
affected by them. First Gulf War of 1991 is a striking example in this sense. Even 
thought Turkey did not take part in the fighting, it was one of the countries who 
suffered the highest economic damage. Besides, the instability in the region caused 
an influx of refugees and a deterioration of PKK problem.  
 
The recent history show Turkey that it is no longer possible to stay out, however its 
historical experience informed Turkey that it is not easy to stay in without suffering 
harsh consequences. In a geography infested with military conflicts, it is not 
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possible to ensure “Peace at home, peace in the world” doctrine alone. The ever 
increasing threats from the Middles East and the uncooperative attitude of the US 
administration persuaded Turkey for further cooperation with EU and paved the 
way for further Europeanization of foreign and security policies.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Over the course of its history “Turkey has historically displayed a relatively 
consistent security culture of Realpolitik which has evolved across the centuries 
from a dominant offensive character into a dominant defensive one” 
(Karaosmanoğlu, 2000; 200) The State has been the provider of the security and 
state security took precedence over other forms of security. This is not surprising 
thinking that Turkey is in a conflict prone, violence infected region where instability 
is abundant and peace is a rare commodity.  
 
Turkey developed a National Security Culture and Identity around Realpolitik 
security orientation and Turkey acted as a Realpolitik security actor. This had been 
the case for a long time until the rise of Justice and Development Party to power and 
the increased influence of European Union accession process, which has taken place 
parallel to the JDP’s rise to power. More and more scholar started to acknowledge 
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the changes taking place in Turkish Foreign and Security making. This inevitably, 
signaled a transformation in the Security Culture of the Turkish State from 
Realpolitik orientation to European one. This thesis tried to examine this 
transformation with the parameters provided in the theoretical sections. It 
operationalized the definitions of European and Realpolitik Security Cultures and 
evaluated the possible transformation in Turkish Security Culture within the 
confines of those definitions and conceptualizations.  
 
The justification for such a study on the transformation on security culture and the 
rationale behind it needs to be explained. First of all, this study is designed to make 
a contribution to the growing Europeanization and Turkish-EU literature. Various 
aspects of Turkish Europeanization have been studied by many scholars and 
understandably many of those studies focus either on domestic institutions and their 
harmonization with EU counterparts or foreign policy of Turkey in line with EU 
accession process. TSC, in this sense, is an area that needs attention and a fertile 
ground for scholarly discussion. That is why this thesis deals with security culture 
and sees it as an important dimension of overall Turkish Europeanization.         
 
 
When it comes to explaining why this study accepts the fact that a transformation is 
security culture is possible (yet difficult and slow) it relies on the theoretical 
arguments provided by the main stream IR approaches. Security Culture, contrary to 
the assumptions of realism, and in line with the assumptions of Constructivism, is 
open to change, as a result of strong internal/external forces or motivators.  That is 
why, as Karaosmanoğlu (2000:200) states, “national security culture is not static; 
indeed it can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded and culturally 
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translated. While National Security Culture is not static and is open to change, as 
Karaosmanoğlu (2000) indicated, it is not elastic either. It does not change overnight 
with daily political events nor does it go with the flow of everyday domestic or 
international politics. The dynamism which opens the gate for change comes from 
the fact that Security Culture and Identity is a socially constructed element of the 
state and with the change in social interactions among the actors, this social 
construct: “National Security Culture” changes. 
 
 
From the foundation of Turkish Republic to current day, the idea of integration with 
European political and economic system proved itself as the strongest incentive for 
such a change in social interactions among the actors. This process, the 
Europeanization as it is generally called is a powerful driving force for Turkey to 
change its policies and practices. While Europeanization motivated important 
changes in Turkish political structure and policies this thesis highlight the primacy 
of the following factors in motivating the perceived Europeanization: Dynamics of 
accession process (which brings in harmonization of Acquis Communautaire and 
reform packages), the pragmatic approach of the JDP-led Turkey towards the EU 
(gaining legitimacy as well as curbing the power of secular elites and appointed 
bureaucracy) Ankara’s own security needs and the desire to achieve a soft balancing 
vis-à-vis the US in the post 9/11 middle East, and finally the ever increasing threat 
stemming from the persisting problems and disputes in the Middle East. When all 
these aspects are taken into account this thesis claims that it has gradually become 
necessary on the part of Turkey to align its foreign and security policy orientation 
with EU standards out of realpolitik concerns rather than ideational ones. Aligning 
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with the EU has lately become an issue of strategic choice rather than ideational 
requirement (Oğuzlu & Özpek, 2008).  
 
 
Turkey used to demonstrate a stronger realpolitik security culture with more reliance 
on Realpolitik instruments; however, with Europeanization process as well as the 
changing dynamics in its immediate surroundings, Turkey started to look for non-
realpolitik or European means. This was not only due to the fact that those 
instruments presented better chance to actualize otherwise realpolitik ends, but also 
because of the JDP related reasons. Out of necessity Turkey discovered European 
means and prioritize the use of such methods. Thanks to the dynamics of the 
accession process, the fears invigorated by American policies in the Middle East and 
the foreign policy visions of the major JDP members including but not limited to 
Gül, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu, Turkey has started to perform a more European style 
foreign and security approach. The crucial question comes at this point: Can we 
confidently call that Turkish Security Culture is Europeanized as Turkey is acting 
more like a European state and emphasizing European means to achieve its goals? 
This thesis, as it defines European Security Culture as “the security mind-set which 
dictates achieving European ends with European means”, claims that the 
transformation we witness in Turkish Security Culture cannot be labeled as true 
Europeanization. Turkey is still pursuing Realpolitik goals of its own only with 
more European means with time. The adaptation of such an attitude and welcoming 
the new means can be explained with strategic choices and foreign policy vision of 
JDP elites.  
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In conclusion, this thesis claims that Turkish Security Culture has not been 
transformed to assume a European nature. Turkey is still pursuing realpolitik ends 
with European means which is a decision out of strategic necessity rather than an 
ideational and normative choice. It is true that Turkey no longer displays rigid 
defensive security culture characteristics and its interactions with its region and the 
EU left their imprints on TSC, however this does not change the fact the Turkey is 
still operating on logic of consequences. On the other hand this does not mean that a 
spill-over effect is out of question. From a neo-functionalist perspective a spill-over 
effect33  is always possible and in the long run Turkey might experience a true 
Europeanization of its security culture. The spill-over effect along with various other 
issues such as the realpolitik challenges to TSC and the future direction of the 
ongoing transformation remain as questions for further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 It means that if Turkey continues with EU accession process and employs European means long 
enough the public as well as policy makers will internalize the means and expand into ends as well. 
With the European means in place. 
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